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The spectrum resources, interference, and energy of battery-based devices are 
predominant problems and challenges in modern wireless networks. This thesis 
therefore addresses these issues by studying a theoretical framework for the design and 
analysis of distributed power control algorithms for modern cognitive radio and 
femtocell networks. It is shown that game theory tools are appropriate and efficient to 
develop scalable, balanced and energy-efficient, distributed power control schemes to 
be practically used in battery-based devices in wireless networks.  
Practically, the problem of power control is modelled as a non-cooperative game in 
which each user chooses its transmit power to maximize (or minimize) its own utility 
(or cost). The utility is defined as the ratio of throughput to transmit power, which is 
used to represent the energy efficiency scheme, whereas the cost is defined as the sum 
of the sigmoid weighting of transmit power and the square of the signal-to-interference 
ratio (SIR) error which is used to represent the SIR balancing scheme. Novel utility and 
cost functions proposed in this work are the method to derive efficient distributed power 
control algorithms. Also, the proposed pricing techniques in this thesis guide users to 
the efficient Nash equilibrium point by encouraging them to use network resources 
efficiently. These frameworks are more general and they are applied on cognitive and 
femtocell networks due to the critical and important issue of interference.    
Numerical simulations are used to prove the effectiveness of these algorithms 
compared with other existing power control algorithms. The simulated analytical and 
numerical results of this thesis indicate that the proposed algorithms can achieve a 
significant reduction of the user’s transmit power and thus a mitigation of the overall 
interference. Moreover, these algorithms have a relatively fast convergence rate and 
guarantee that all users can achieve their required QoS.              
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ABSTRAK 
Sumber spektrum, gangguan, dan tenaga peranti yang berasaskan bateri adalah 
masalah dan cabaran yang mendominasi rangkaian moden tanpa wayar. Oleh itu, tesis 
ini menangani isu-isu ini dengan mengkaji rangka kerja teoritikal untuk merekabentuk 
dan menganalisis algoritma agihan kawalan kuasa untuk rangkaian radio kognitif dan 
femto sel moden. Ia menunjukkan bahawa alat-alat teori permainan yang sesuai dan 
berkesan untuk membangunkan pengagihan skim kawalan kuasa boleh skala, seimbang, 
cekap tenaga, yang praktikal untuk digunakan dalam peranti yang berasaskan bateri 
dalam rangkaian tanpa wayar. 
Secara praktik, masalah kawalan kuasa dimodelkan sebagai satu permainan yang 
bukan koperatif di mana setiap pengguna memilih kuasa penghantar untuk 
memaksimumkan (atau mengurangkan) utiliti sendiri (atau kos). Utiliti ditakrifkan 
sebagai nisbah pemprosesan untuk menghantar kuasa, yang digunakan untuk mewakili 
skim kecekapan tenaga, manakala kos ditakrifkan sebagai jumlah penghantaran 
pemberat sigmoid kuasa dan isyarat kuasa dua kepada gangguan kesilapan (SIR) yang 
digunakan untuk mewakili skim pengimbangan SIR.Satu utiliti dan kos fungsi yang 
novel dicadangkan dalam kerja-kerja ini adalah merupakan satu kaedah untuk memandu 
algoritma pengagihan kawalan kuasa diagihkan yang cekap. Selain itu, teknik harga 
yang dicadangkan di dalam tesis ini membolehkan pengguna menuju ke titik 
keseimbangan Nash yang cekap dengan menggalakkan mereka menggunakan sumber 
rangkaian yang sangat cekap. Rangka kerja ini adalah lebih umum dan ia diaplikasikan 
didalam rangkaian kognitif dan femto sel disebabkan oleh isu yang kritikal dan penting 
di dalam gangguan. 
Simulasi berangka digunakan untuk membolehkan keberkesanan algoritma ini 
dibandingkan dengan algoritma kawalan kuasa lain yang sedia ada. Simulasi analisis 
v 
dan keputusan berangka di dalam tesis ini menunjukkan bahawa algoritma yang 
dicadangkan boleh mencapai pengurangan yang ketara dari segi penghantaran kuasa 
oleh pengguna dan dengan itu meringankan gangguan keseluruhan. Selain itu, algoritma 
ini mempunyai kadar penumpuan yang agak cepat dan dijamin bahawa semua pengguna 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Introduction 1.1
Since the beginning of wireless communications, radio resource management (RRM) 
has emerged as a required framework in network design. The main purpose of RRM is 
to achieve the wireless network objectives (application or services requirements) under 
certain radio resources constraints (e.g. radio spectrum resources, transmission rate, 
transmission power).  One of the most important components of RRM is power control, 
whose principal purpose is to achieve better signal quality for each user without causing 
excessive interference to other users in the wireless system. An increase in co-channel 
interference (resulting from spectrum sharing) causes major channel impairments and 
thus leads to a further deterioration in the performance of wireless communications.  
Recently, the problem of power control was considered in the cognitive radio 
networks and femtocell networks based game theory with a new design of utility and 
cost functions. Zhang et al. (2012) and his co-authors introduced the concept of the 
target SIR to modify the utility, and they modified the Shuffled Frog Leaping Algorithm 
(SFLA) to improve the accuracy of the power control solution. In other work, power 
control game proposed by Kuo et al., (2013)  has been improved based on the outage 
probability of the PU in a spectrum-underlay CRN and they designed an efficient swarm 
intelligent algorithm to improve the convergence speed and improve the energy-
efficiency. A payment-based power control scheme based on a non-cooperative power 
control game has been considered by  Xie et al. (2014), in which the distance of the CRs 
and SIR were used as a reference for punishment price setting.  
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The problem of power control also considered based on game theory and using cost 
functions in cognitive radio networks. Li et al. (2011) proposed a new power control 
game based on the cost function and the target of the transmit power has been included, 
such as the target SIR. The cost function in Li et al. (2011) is defined as a weighted sum 
of the logarithm of SIR error and the logarithm of power error. The algorithm has many 
advantages, such as fast convergence, better anti-noise performance and capacity. Lu et 
al. (2012) proposed a power control game in CDMA cognitive radio networks based on 
the cost function and they used two SIR thresholds in order to adjust the interference 
factor of power and improve the fairness. In another work, Junhui et al., (2013) 
proposed a non-cooperative power control algorithm based on the cost function similar 
to Li et al. (2011) by using the square root function instead of the logarithm to fast 
algorithm. Jiao et al., (2013) investigated how to decide the transmission power levels 
of cognitive radio users using non-cooperative game theory. They proposed a novel cost 
function, in which the thresholds of the SINR and transmission power level were 
considered. Their algorithm’s numerical results indicated better performance in terms of 
anti-noise. 
On the other hand, to mitigate cross-tier interference and guarantee QoS for both 
MUEs and FUEs, an efficient distributed power control is necessary in both systems.  
Power control has been considered in femtocell networks to mitigate the cross-tier 
interference between two-tier (Kang et al., 2012; Ngo et al., 2012; Han et al., 2013; Xie 
et al., 2013). Moreover, the game theory-based power control has been considered for 
HetNet small cell networks (Xu et al., 2014), in which the authors addressed the 
mitigation of the cross-tier interference problem by ensuring the protection of macrocell 
users. 
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Since the emergence of third-generation cellular networks, the sudden rise in the 
number of mobiles that can use high speed data services and applications has produced 
an ever increasing demand for reliable high-speed data services. This market has led to 
the emergence of many techniques that can utilize the spectrum resources and mitigate 
interference. Cognitive radios (CRs) have emerged as a promising solution for the 
spectrum utilization problem, due to their ability to access and utilize the unused parts 
of the licensed spectrum without causing harmful interference. In addition, the femto-
cell has also emerged as another solution for spectrum sharing, short range, and low 
power data transmission. 
Data communications (non-real time applications) like web browsing and file 
downloads are error sensitive and delay tolerant which requires a larger SIR. Increasing 
the SIR guarantees that the information data will be delivered to the receiver correctly, 
and this will decrease the number of retransmissions. Therefore, the level of satisfaction 
achieved by each user is a continuous function of the SIR (Goodman & Mandayam, 
2000).  In this thesis, we focus on the design of utility (cost) function criteria for the 
power control design, which aims to mitigate interference during spectrum sharing by 
reducing the power consumed by cognitive radio or femtocell users. In addition, 
reduction of the power consumed will lead to a more extended battery-power life of 
terminals. In a distributed power control, all users update their power level based on 
local information. These objectives can be achieved by representing the network using 
game theory, wherein the users select their transmit power level according to a cost-
minimization or (utility maximization) criterion. In this case, the distributed power 
control is represented by a non-cooperative game and the available strategy for each 
user is the power strategy.  
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Game theory has been considered as an effective and useful mathematical tool to 
study distributed power control in wireless data networks. Power control algorithms 
resulting from the game-theoretic approach are decentralized, in which each individual 
user select its own transmit power from a transmit power strategy through a non-
cooperative scheme. In a distribution (non-cooperative) scheme, users update their 
transmit power using limited local information, so the outcome of the game is 
suboptimal compared with those obtained via centralized schemes. To overcome the 
suboptimal problem, pricing or referee approaches have been proposed. On the other 
hand, a distributed scheme is more scalable and is thus practically used in large wireless 
networks.  
The next chapter presents a literature review on the power control techniques from 
voice cellular networks and then in wireless data and modern networks that are based on 
non-cooperative game theory. In this thesis, we will address the problem of a power 
control game for modern cognitive radio and femtocell networks.                    
 Objective of study 1.2
This thesis is motivated on the application of a non-cooperative game theory 
framework to distributed power control in the cognitive radio and femtocell wireless 
communication networks. Due to the spectrum sharing between different classes of 
mobile users, we propose efficient power control algorithms to reduce the power 
consumed, mitigate cross-interference, and improve spectrum utilization.  
In this context, the objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
 To design efficient frameworks for distributed power control to improve the 
present results available in the literature for SIR-based and energy-efficient 
approaches that can be applied in modern wireless networks. 
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 To introduce appropriate utility and cost functions that have a physical 
meaning to improve spectrum sharing, mitigate cross interference, and reduce 
the power consumed.    
 To prove analytically the existence and uniqueness of the solution (referred to 
the Nash equilibrium) of the non-cooperative power control games. 
 To derive theoretically the distributed and iterative algorithms of a power 
control scheme that can converge to the Nash equilibrium solution and 
present the results by numerical simulations. 
 Research methodology 1.3
In modern wireless communication networks, the spectrum resources and 
interference should be managed efficiently to cope with the increase of users and 
services. In fact, each user in a wireless network represents a competitor for network 
resources, and is trying to satisfy its own QoS requirement by choosing the best 
response action. These actions (strategy) could involve the transmission power, 
transmission rate, modulation, packet size, etc. Therefore, the action chosen by any user 
will affect the performance of other users. The user’s QoS can be referred to as the 
utility or cost function, in which each user tries to choose its transmit power action to 
maximize (minimize) its utility (cost) function.    
The cognitive radio and femtocell communication networks studied in this research 
are assumed to consist of three basic elements:  
i. Users of the network represented by cognitive radio (CR) users, femtocell 
user equipments (FUEs) or macrocell user equipments (MUEs) 
ii.  An action set (strategy set) that represents the network resources such as 
transmits power. 
iii. The utility function that measures the preference of the user. 
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A game theory tool is proposed in this thesis to exemplify the problem of power 
control in the cognitive radio and femtocell communication networks. The users of the 
network are the players (decision makers) of the game, the transmit-power levels 
represent the strategy action of the game, and the users’ utility function represents the 
utility of the game. 
In this thesis, the problem of power control based on a game theoretic framework is 
presented in three different approaches. 
In the first approach, we used control theory concepts for SIR balancing to propose a 
new sigmoid-based cost function for cognitive radios to derive the power control game. 
In this scheme, each CR tries to minimize its own cost by achieving the target SIR with 
flexible reduction. We proved the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and 
the convergence of the proposed algorithm. The sigmoid function applied to the price 
part of the cost function induced the proposed power control algorithm to guide users to 
better performance in terms of SIR and power consumption. 
In the second approach, we used the energy efficiency scheme to design the power 
control game for cognitive radios. A novel energy efficiency utility function (utility-
price) has been proposed which represents the amount of information bits that are 
successfully transmitted per joule of energy consumed. Also, each CR tries to maximize 
its own utility function with some constraints, similarly to an optimization problem. The 
proposed algorithm shows quick convergence and better performance compare with 
related works.   
In the last approach, we proposed an efficient power control and interference 
management for two-tier femtocell networks, with different classes of users, where 
MUEs represent high priority access users and FUEs represent low priority access users. 
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The utility function is assigned to each type of user depending on the QoS requirement. 
The goal is to mitigate cross-tier interference between two tier networks. The local term 
that is introduced into the utility function of the femtocell user is the key to the better 
performance of our proposed algorithm. 
In all approaches, we proved the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium 
and the convergence of our proposed algorithms. We used the same system parameters 
during the comparison between our proposed algorithms and the previous works in the 
literature.   
  The numerical analysis and simulation of the proposed power control algorithms 
were generated using MATLAB codes.   
 Thesis organization 1.4
This thesis is organized as follows. 
In chapter 2, we introduce a brief review on game theory, in which the most 
important concepts used in this thesis (non-cooperative game, strategy game, utility 
function, dominant strategy, Nash equilibrium, and Pareto optimality) are defined. 
Furthermore, an example of the game theory ―prisoner’s dilemma‖ is given to illustrate 
the basic game model, the output of the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Next, 
we review the proposed algorithms of distributed power control in cellular radio 
networks. Subsequently, the difference between the utility function used in the wireless 
voice system and wireless data system is explained. After that, power control algorithms 
for wireless data networks and based on game theory are reviewed according to the 
utility or cost function that is applied. Lastly, literature works on power control in the 
modern wireless network (cognitive radio and femtocell networks) based on game 
theory are reviewed to provide the foundation of the work presented in this thesis.   
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In chapter 3, we introduce a new SIR-based sigmoid power control in cognitive radio 
networks based on non-cooperative game. After discussing and explaining the 
differences between the design of distributed power control in the control theory and 
game theory perspectives, we introduce a new cost function for a power control game 
based on a sigmoid function. We then study the existence, uniqueness, and the 
convergence of the proposed game, and we formulate an iterative power update 
algorithm to reach the resulting Nash equilibrium depending only on local information 
(distribution). In addition, we improve the speed of convergence of the sigmoid power 
control algorithm using Newton’s numerical method.   
In chapter 4, we formulate the power control scheme using an energy-efficient 
approach in which the objective is to maximize the number of transmitted bits per 
energy. A novel utility function via pricing has been proposed which guides cognitive 
radios to the efficient Nash equilibrium. The proposed power control algorithm guides 
the CRs closest to the base station to achieve their QoS requirement with a low cost, 
whereas it guides the CRs farthest from the base station to achieve their QoS 
requirement with a high cost to reduce the amount of interference. We prove the 
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the power control game and the 
conditions of the selected pricing factors. Furthermore, we explain the difference 
between the linear and power functions with the pricing function, and the effect of a 
weighting factor on the utility function and transmit power. The simulation results have 
been compared with different and recent energy efficient power control algorithms to 
show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. 
In chapter 5, we present a new power control scheme for distributed interference 
management in two-tier femtocell networks. The objective of the algorithm is to 
guarantee that higher priority users (MUEs) achieve their required QoS, whereas lower 
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priority users (FUEs) demand certain QoS requirements. In this scheme, two classes of 
users are acting as decision makers with different utility functions. We prove 
analytically the convergence of the algorithm and the features of the proposed algorithm 
are confirmed through a comparison with previous work that used the traditional Norm-
2 algorithm. 
  In chapter 6, we summarize and conclude this thesis and we discuss future works 
and further perspectives for this area of research.  













CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In the past decade, the concepts of game theory applied in wireless communication 
systems have increased dramatically, being used to solve a variety of problems in the 
networks (Lasaulce & Tembine, 2011; Zhang & Guizani, 2011). Many resource 
allocation problems can be solved and utilized based on game theory in different 
scenarios and the problems considered include one or more wireless issues, such as 
bandwidth allocation, rate control, power control, flow control, routing, and medium 
access control (MacKenzie & DaSilva, 2006). Game theory has been launched and 
applied in wireless data networks, and then it has also been extensively applied in 
modern networks such as cognitive radio and femtocell networks. It is used to solve 
spectrum management and spectrum sharing issues in cognitive radio networks (Wang 
et al., 2008;  Ji & Liu, 2007), as well as the cross-tier interference, spectrum sharing and 
energy issues in femtocell networks (Kang et al., 2012; Ngo et al., 2012;  Han et al., 
2013;  Xie et al., 2013). 
In this chapter, a brief overview of non-cooperative game theory fundamentals and 
concepts relevant to this thesis is presented. The chapter begins with an introduction to 
non-cooperative game theory, and brief definitions of the most important concepts of 
non-cooperative games, such as utility, strategy games, dominant strategies, etc. This is 
followed by an example to illustrate and analyse the behaviour of decision makers in the 
non-cooperative game. In the next subsection, the development of power control from 
voice cellular networks to wireless data networks is reviewed, and we highlight the 
concept of utility and cost functions that has been used to represent quality of service 
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(QoS) in wireless data as a substitute for the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) of voice 
cellular networks. Finally, we review the most important works on non-cooperative 
power control games applied in modern cognitive radio and femtocell networks that are 
related to this thesis.                
 Non-cooperative game theory – fundamentals and concepts 2.1
The increasing number of mobile users, services, and applications in current and 
future wireless communication networks needs novel analytical frameworks that are 
capable of meeting the numerous technical challenges. Accordingly, in recent years 
game theory has emerged as an efficient mathematical tool for the design of future 
wireless and communication networks. It is one of the best methods for the 
incorporation of decision making rules and techniques into next-generation wireless and 
communication nodes to allow them to operate efficiently and meet the users’ required 
communication quality of services (Han et al., 2011). The problem of power control in 
cellular networks is one of the most popular applications of game theory. The problem 
in the design of uplink cellular networks is how to allow users to regulate their transmit 
power during utilization of a common spectrum, given the interference caused by other 
users in the network. Researchers and wireless engineers have been able to represent the 
problem of power control in a cellular network by using non-cooperative game theory. 
All the finite numbers of players in the non-cooperative game are in a competitive 
situation, in which each action of a player (select a strategy), will have an impact 
(positive or negative) on the utility (e.g. the preference or gain) of the other players. 
Likewise, in a power control in a wireless network, all mobile users are in a competitive 
situation in which the transmit power level selected from the power strategy of a mobile 
user will change the interference level of the cell and will then affect positively or 
negatively the transmission QoS of the other users. Consequently, solving the power 
control problem in cellular networks is equivalent to solving a non-cooperative game, 
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i.e., by finding Nash equilibrium (Han et al., 2011). Recently, many researchers have 
been involved in applying the game theory approach to solve the problems in wireless 
networks, but they face many difficulties finding accurate models and solutions. This 
due to the design of game theoretic models that do not matched specific engineering 
issues such as the time varying wireless channel condition, performance functions (i.e., 
utilities) that depend on many communication metrics (e.g., transmission power and 
rate, delay, signal-to-interference ratio), and conforming to certain standards (e.g., 
CDMA, IEEE 802.16, LTE).  Therefore, it is necessary to find effective analytic models 
from game theory that can be used in the design of future wireless and communication 
networks (Han et al., 2011).              
2.1.1 Non-cooperative game theory 
Game theory is a wide-ranging field of applied mathematics that defines and analyses 
the situations between interactive decision makers. In particular, it provides a 
framework based on the construction of rigorous models that describe situations of 
conflict and cooperation between rational decision makers (Tadelis, 2013). In decision 
theory and economics, rational behaviour is defined as choosing actions that maximize 
the payoff subject to constraints.  Game theory has been successfully applied in many 
areas such as economics, business competition, the functioning of markets, jury voting, 
and auctions. Game theory has also been useful in other disciplines, such as political 
science, sociology and biology (Straffin, 1993).  Since the early 1990s, engineering and 
computer science have been added to the list of disciplines. In recent years, game theory 
has been widely applied in telecommunications engineering, and specifically, wireless 
radio resource management (Altman et al., 2006; Felegyhazi & Hubaux, 2006; 
MacKenzie & DaSilva, 2006).  
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In game theory, each player competes with other players to optimize (maximize) its 
own utility by adjusting the strategy. The utility of a player is a function that measures 
the player’s level of satisfaction. Utility and strategy games can be defined as follows: 
Definition 2.1: ―In any game, utility (payoff) u represents the motivation of players‖.  
The utility function for a given player assigns a number for every possible outcome 
of the game with the property that a higher (or lower) number implies that the outcome 
is more preferred (Hossain et al., 2009). 
Definition 2.2:  ―A strategy r is a complete contingent plan, or a decision rule, that 
defines the action an agent will select in every distinguishable state A  of the world‖ 
(Hossain et al., 2009). 
A strategic form of game consists of three elements:  
(1) a set of rational decision makers referred to as players, 
(2)  a set of strategies associated with the players, 
(3)  the payoffs (utilities) function received by each player, which represents the 
objective.  
A game with N players can be formulated mathematically as shown in the following 
definition (Gibbons, 1992): 
Definition 2.3: A game  in normal form is given by }{},{, ii uAN , where: 
(1) }...,,3,2,1{ nN   is a finite set of players, 
(2) }{ iA is the strategy (action) set for player i , where ni AAAA  ....21  is the 
product of the sets of strategies available to each player, and  
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(3) }...,,{}{ 11 ni uuuu  is the set of the utility functions for player i . In the strategy 
profile, supposing that Aa , we let ii Aa  denote player si' action (strategy) 
and ia  denote the actions (strategies) of the other 1i players. 
Games can be classified based on their application: a cooperative game, in which the 
players can communicate amongst each other to make enforceable contracts, and a non-
cooperative game as defined before, in which players cannot communicate amongst 
themselves and are unable to make enforceable contracts. The non-cooperative  game  is  
the  only  choice  if  the  information  is  strictly  limited  to local information (Hossain 
et al., 2009). If the players make a decision one time, the game is called static, whereas 
if the players make a decision several times, the game is called dynamic. Repeated 
games are games in which the players make a decision once, but the game is played 
several times.  
The  most  important  concepts  in  game  theory  are  the  non-cooperative  game, 
dominant  strategy,  dominated  strategy,  Nash  equilibrium,  and  Pareto  optimality 
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). 
Non-cooperative game theory is a branch of game theory, in which rational decision 
makers make decisions independently. Hence, it studies the behaviour of decision 
makers in any situation in which each rational decision-maker’s optimal choice may 
depend on his forecast of the choices of others. In another context, decision makers in a 
non-cooperative game aim to improve their objective (preference) selfishly.  
Definition 2.4:  ―A non-cooperative game is one in which players are unable to make 
enforceable contracts outside of those specifically modeled in the game. Hence, it is not 
defined  as  games  in  which  players  do  not  cooperate,  but  as  a  game  in  which  
any cooperation must be self-enforcing‖ (Hossain et al., 2009). 
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Definition 2.5:  ―Dominant strategies:  A strategy is dominant if, regardless of what 
other players do, the strategy earns a player a larger payoff than any others do. Hence, a 
strategy is dominant if it is always better than any other strategy, regardless of what 
opponents may do. If a player has a dominant strategy then he or she will always play it 
in equilibrium. In addition, if one strategy is dominant, then all others are dominated‖ 
(Hossain et al., 2009). 
Definition 2.6:  ―Dominated strategies: A strategy is dominated if, regardless of 
what any  other  players  do,  the  strategy  earns  a  player  a  smaller  payoff  than  
some  other strategy. 
Hence,  a  strategy  is  dominated  if  it  is  always  better  to  play  some  other  
strategy, regardless  of  what  opponents  may  do.  A dominated strategy is never 
played in equilibrium‖ (Hossain et al., 2009). 
Definition 2.7:  A Nash equilibrium of a game }{},{, ii uAN  is a profile Aa 
*
of strategies with the property that for every player Ni , 
),(),( *** iiiiii aauaau          for all Ni ,....,2,1                         (2.1) 








niii aaaaaa    
The Nash equilibrium is a stable point, in which no user has any incentive to change 
its strategy. An efficient method to obtain the Nash equilibrium is to find the best 
response of the players. In game theory, the best response of the player is its strategy, 
which produces the most favorable outcome, taking other players’ strategies as given 
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991).  
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Definition 2.8:  A set of strategies, ),...,,( 21 naaa is Pareto optimal if and only if 
there exists no other set of strategies ),...,,( 21 nbbb such that 
)()( aubu ii         for all Ni ,....,2,1                      (2.2) 
In the Pareto optimal solution the players can not in any way improve their current 
payoffs (utilities) through a different strategy choice without reducing others’ payoffs. 
To illustrate the above concepts and definitions, it is worth considering the example 
of a classic two player game named the prisoner’s dilemma.  
Game theory example (prisoners dilemma) 
The prisoner dilemma model is the famous ―game‖ that has been analysed by game 
theory to explain the behaviours of players (Geckil & Anderson, 2009). The prisoner’s 
dilemma model can be explained as follows:  
The police in a joint crime arrested two partners and separated them into different 
rooms. The police offer each of them the same deal:  to confess to the crime or remain 
silent. The punishment that each receives is dependent not only on his or her decision, 
but also on the decision of his or her partner. The possible outcomes of this model are as 
follows:  
(1) If one of the partners confesses to the crime while the other remains silent, 
the confessor will be set free (i.e., payoff of 0) and the  other  partner  will  
get  a  maximum  sentence  (i.e.,  payoff  of  -9)  because  the information 
provided by the confessor is used to incriminate him or her.  
(2) If both partners confess to the crime, then each gets a reduced sentence (i.e., 
payoff of -6) but neither is set free.  
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(3) If neither partner confesses to the crime, then each gets the minimum 
sentence (i.e., payoff of -1).  
In this game, the set of players contains two players (the prisoners) 2n , and thus
}2,1{N . Each player has a finite set of allowed strategies (meaning that the prisoner 
game is a finite game) that is represented by space }SilentRemain , Confess{21  AA .  
Table 2.1: Bi-matrix form of prisoner dilemma game 
                                                             Prisoner 2  














 Confess Remain Silent 
Confess (-6,-6) (0,-9) 
Remain Silent (-9,0) (-1,-1) 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma game can be explained mathematically as follows: 
a. Two partners represent the set of players in a game }2,1{N . 
b. The strategy sets of the game are:  (confess, confess), (confess, remain silent),  
(remain silent, confess), (remain silent, remain silent). 
c. The  outcome  (payoffs)  of  the  game  can  be:  (-6,  -6),  (0,  -9),  (-9,  0),  (-1,  
-1), which depend on the chosen pairs of strategies. 
The prisoner’s dilemma model can be represented as a bi-matrix as shown in Table 
2.1, in which player 1 plays as the row player and player 2 plays as the column player. 
The solution of this game can be easily found. Player 1 thinks that the best response 
strategy to choose is to confess. Similarly, player 2 also thinks that the best response for 
him is to confess to whatever player 1 chooses. The strategy pair (confess, confess) is 
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the solution of this game and it is called the Nash equilibrium solution, in which no 
player can unilaterally increase his own outcome (payoff). The Nash equilibrium 
outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game (-6, -6) is not the Pareto optimality of the 
game because there is another outcome, (-1, -1) that is better for the players.  The Pareto 
optimality outcome (1, -1) can be obtained by allowing the two partners to cooperate, 
then they would choose the (remain silent, remain silent) strategy. 
2.1.2 Auction Games (Economic games) 
Due to the ability of game theory to study interaction behavior between decision 
makers and players, it can be applied also to the economic to study interact between 
firms and people in the real market. The concepts of game theory and economic models 
lead to new interesting games and successful theoretic results in microeconomics and 
auction theory.  
In economics, players of the game are sellers and buyers in the market (e.g., firms, 
individuals, and so on), payoff functions are defined as the utility or revenue that 
players want to maximize, and equilibrium strategies are of considerable interest. On the 
other hand, they are distinguished from fundamental game theory, not only because 
additional market constraints such as supply and demand curves and auction rules give 
insight on market structures, but also because they are fully-developed with their own 
research concerns (Wang. B. et al., 2010).  
In actual fact, the research on the game theory is much older than the Cournot model, 
one of market equilibria literally exists as a unique field. Hence, this subsection to 
address those economic games, so as to respect the distinction of these games and to 
highlight their intensive use in cognitive radio networks. The application of these types 
of games into cognitive radio networks has the following advantages. First, economic 
models can be represented in the spectrum sharing scenario, in which the secondary 
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spectrum (unused part) market owned by primary users can be sell right to cognitive 
radios or secondary users. Primary users, as sellers, have the incentive to trade 
temporarily unused spectrum for monetary gains, while secondary users, as buyers, may 
want to pay for spectrum resources for data transmissions. The deal between buyers and 
sellers is made through pricing, auctions, or other means. Second, the idea of the game 
in economy can be extended to some cognitive radio scenarios other than spectrum 
markets and relation between sellers and buyers. Stackelberg game is example, 
originally describing an economic model, has been generalized to a strategic game 
consisting of a leader and a follower. Third, due to the combination of technology, 
policy, and markets properties of cognitive radio networks, it is important to study 
cognitive radio networks from the economic perspective and develop effective 
procedures (e.g., auction mechanisms) to regulate the spectrum market.  
Auction Game example: Cournot’s of oligopoly  
Another example of non-cooperative game is Cournot’s of oligopoly, in which the 
strategic game consist of: 
1. The players of the game (firms) 
2. The action of each firm (set of possible outputs) 
3. Payoff of each firm (profit) 
In this game model, each firm selects its output independently (non-cooperate), and 
the market determines the price at which it is sold. 
There are n firms produce a single good and the cost of firm i of producing iq  units 
of goods is )( ii qC , where iC is nonnegative and increasing function. The firms’ total 
output isQ , then the market price is )(QP where P is non-increasing inverse demand 
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function. If the output of each firm i  is iq , then the revenue is ).....( 1 ni qqPq  . Thus, 
the profit of firm i is the difference between revenue and cost as 
)().....(),...,( 11 iinini qCqqPqqq                               (2.3) 
Consider competing of two firms and each one cost function is given by iii cqqC )(
















                           
(2.4)
 
where 0  and 0c are constants. Constant unit cost iiii qcqC )(  where c . 


















       
(2.5)
 
   The solution of the game is the Nash Equilibrium and it can be found based on best 
response function.    
If 02 q then firm 1’s profit is )()0,( 1111 qcqq   for 1q . The output of 1q













                                  
(2.6)
 
The firm 1’s best response to an output zero for firm 2 is )(
2
1
)0( cbi   .  As the 
output 2q of firm 2 increases, the profit firm 1 can obtain at any given output decreases, 
because more output of firm 2 means a lower price.  
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(2.7)
 
Because firm 2’s cost function is the same as firm 1’s, its best response function 
)( 12 qb is also the same: for any number q , we have )()( 12 qbqb  .  




1 qq of of outputs for which 1q is a best response to
2q and 2q  is a best response to 1q .   
Here, we assume two firms has cost function as qq 30)(  ; the inverse demand 
function for the firms output is  QP 120 ,  ( 120 ) where Q is the total output. 
Then, firm 1’s profit is: 1211 30)120( qqqq  . Taking the derivative of this profit with 
respect to 1q  ( 2q constant) and setting the derivative equal to zero, we obtain  
0302120 21  qq                                          (2.8)
 
Or 2/)90( 21 qq  . Thus, the best response function of firm 1’s is given by
2/)90()( 221 qqb  . Similarly, we find that the best response function of firm 2 is 
given by 2/)90()( 111 qqb  . 
22 
 





1 qq  
 Cognitive Radio Networks 2.2
The increased demand of current wireless networks technology and the large number 
of mobile terminals in the world, all of which compete to access a limited amount of 
licensed and unlicensed radio frequency spectrums, has become the most important 
issue in wireless technology. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
measurements (2002a) have shown that the licensed frequency bands are not used most 
of the time and the limit of unlicensed spectrum bands is worsening. In addition, some 
parts of frequency bands are used heavily in particular locations and at particular times. 
The FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force (SPTF) found that the spectrum percentage usage 
ranges from 15% to 85% in the licensed spectrum band below 3GHz. 
There has been a dramatic increase in the access to limited spectrum for mobile 
services and applications in recent years. Therefore, the fixed spectrum assignment 
policy that was working well in the past is not efficient now to use (Chen and Prasad, 
2009). Recently, new spectrum allocation technique called Dynamic Spectrum Access 






































(DSA) is used to solve the above spectrum efficiency problem by allowing unlicensed 
users with cognitive capability to use the licensed spectrum bands when the licensed 
users are absent, and leave the channel when the licensed user is detected. Spectrum 
hole is the unused part of spectrum, which is defined as a band of frequencies assigned 
to the licensed users, but at a particular time can be utilize by unlicensed users when and 










Figure 2.2: Spectrum Holes 
Cognitive Radio (CR), based on a software-defined radio, has recently appeared as a 
new smart technique for designing future wireless networks. This is due to its ability to 
perceptive its radio frequency environment, learn, adapt, and then reconfigure the 
system operation to utilize the radio spectrum efficiently and guarantee high reliable 





Spectrum in Use 
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Mitola and Maguire (1999) introduces the term of cognitive radio. The main 
objective of cognitive radio is to use the network resources efficiently. Cognitive radio 
technology uses secondary systems to improve spectral efficiency, which represent the 
most important issue in wireless communication systems. SUs improve spectral 
efficiency by sensing unused licensed spectrum frequency (spectrum hole) and use it for 
its transmission. Cognitive cycle that was given by Mitola and Maguire in 1999, consist 
of three basic tasks:  
1) Radio sense analysis 
2) Channel identification. 
3) Transmit power control and dynamic spectrum management.  
 
In radio sense analysis, cognitive radio estimates the total interference in the radio 
environment and detects the spectrum hole. Whereas, in channel identification task, 
cognitive radio estimates the channel state information and predicts channel capacity for 
use by the transmitter. In the third task, transmit power is adapted to full power limits 
when necessary on the one hand and to lower levels on the other hand to allow greater 
sharing and reuse of spectrum, dynamic spectrum management, adaptive modulation 
and coding and transmit rate control. The third task especially transmits power control is 
focused in this dissertation. The basic cognitive cycle including the most important 













Figure 2.3: Basic cognitive cycle Mitola (1999) 
The FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force of Unlicensed Devices and Experimental 
Licenses Working (2002b) introduced a new method used to measure the amount of 
interference in cognitive radio system called Interference Temperature TI . 
Interference Temperature TI is used to manage and quantify the source of interference 
in the radio environment. Interference Temperature limit in this method is used to limit 
the amount of interference tolerable caused to the PUs in a particular frequency and 
particular location. SUs that access licensed spectrum have to measure interference 
temperature and adjust their transmission power in such a way to be under the 
interference temperature limit. For a given a bandwidth  the measurement of 
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where ),( WfP c  is the interference power in watt measured at receiver, k is 
Bolzmanns constant 231038.1 k joules per kelvin degree, and W is the bandwidth in 
Hertz centered at frequency cf  
There are two models of interference temperature studied by Clancy and Arbaugh in 
2006, namely; (i) ideal interference temperature model, and (ii) generalized interference 
temperature model. 
In ideal interference model, authors limited the interference specifically to the 
licensed signals. Then, the transmission of SU must guarantee the following 








                                     
(2.10)
 
where iM is a constant between 0 and 1, and   referred to the user index in the system. 
In the generalized interference temperature model, the knowledge of signal 
environment is not available, and consequently no way to distinguish licensed signals 
from interference and noise (Clancy and Arbaugh, 2006). Therefore, the interference 
temperature is defined to the entire frequency range, and for the interference 
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 Review of power control fundamentals  2.3
In wireless communication, radio resource management (RRM) is proposed to 
promote the QoS of the system and share the available spectrum resources between 
users efficiently. Several RRM components are working together to improve the QoS of 
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users, such as admission control, transmission power control, rate allocation, handoffs, 
channel assignment and adaptive beam forming.  Power control (PC) is one of the most 
important techniques in RRM and plays a major role in resource allocation on the 
wireless radio communication network. PC helps with several functionalities in wireless 
cellular networks (Chiang et al., 2008): 
a) Interference management: PC mitigates the interference to increase system 
capacity by ensuring efficient spectral reuse and a desirable user experience. 
b) Energy management: PC conserves the energy to extend the battery life in 
wireless terminals and networks. 
c) Connectivity management:  PC is able to maintain a minimum level of received 
signal so that the terminal can stay connected.  
Power control in wireless networks is classified based on the directions of 
transmission as: uplink (reverse link) power control in which the direction of 
transmission is from mobile stations (MS) to the base stations (BS), and downlink 
(forward link) power control in which the direction of transmission is from base stations 
to mobile stations. The challenges in uplink power control are the limited transmit 
power in battery-based mobiles, low computational capability of mobiles, and the 
near/far effects. 
Power control is also classified based on the uses of information, as centralized or 
distributed. In centralized power control, the centralized controller (e.g. base station) 
uses information such as path gain to calculate and select suitable actions for all mobile 
users. On the other hand, users in the distributed power control use only local 
information to select their actions. Each user in the distributed wireless network uses 
only local information and it does not know the channel conditions of other users. Users 










Figure 2.1 illustrates as an example part of a multi-cell cellular network with two 
base stations (Base A and Base B) and two mobile stations (MS-i and MS-j). It is shown 
that MS-i is connected with Base A and MS-j is connected with Base B. 
 
                                                                                              
                                                                                                              
                                                                                                 
                                                      
                                     
                                                                                                
                             
Figure 2.4: An example of uplink transmission in multi-cell cellular networks 
Here, we only illustrate and discuss the uplink transmission case (transmission from 
MS to Base station), but the downlink transmission is similar. It is shown in Figure 2.1 
that the signal from MS-i to Base station ―A‖ interferes with the signal from MS-j to 
Base station ―A‖. In the general case, each mobile station experiences not only 
interference resulting from other users but also background noise. The signal to 
interference ratio (SIR) and the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) will be use 
to compare the quality of the desired signal to the interferer. Thus, the signal to 
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where ip , iAg , jAg are the transmit power of user i , link gain from MS-i and MS-j to 
the (Base station A) respectively, and i  is the background noise. Similary, the signal to 









                                              (2.13) 
where jBg and iBg  are the link gain from MS-j and MS-i to the Base station B 
respectively. 
The numerator of equations (2.3) and (2.4) expresses the Base station power signal 
received from the MS to which it is connected, whereas the denominator of the 
equations expresses the sum of the received power signals from other interfering MS 
plus the background noise of the channel. 
In general, the signal to interference ratio SIR of the thi user, where Ni ,....,3,2,1  























                                      (2.14) 
where iI  is the total interference of all users except user i . 
The quality of the signal depends on the value of the SIR, in which a higher SIR of 
the link means a better quality signal and vice versa. Let us consider that the 
interference of other users plus the background noise that is found in the denominator of 
equations (2.3) and (2.4) are fixed and only a connected mobile user can use any 
transmission power. The SIR of this link increases as the link increases its transmission 
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power. Increasing the transmit power of the link to achieve the maximum SIR is 
undesirable because the link will consume much energy to achieve a good quality signal 
which may be higher than it really needs for a particular application (Douros & Polyzos, 
2011). Thus, it is better for the mobile station to increase its transmission power to such 
a level that the terminal can achieve its own target SIR.  
On the other hand, the competition of mobile stations to improve their own SIR by 
increasing their transmission power is not feasible because each terminal represents a 
source of interference to others. Notice that the mobile station can adjust its 
transmission power to improve the SIR that its attached base station perceives. 
However, the obtained value of the SIR at the base station is unknown to the mobile 
station because the mobile station only knows its transmission power. Moreover, the 
base station knows the total received power from all mobile stations. The information of 
total received power may be sent to the mobile station through the feedback channel. 
Thus, the mobile station can easily subtract its own contribution to the total power to 
compute the current SIR based on its knowledge of the link gain to the base station.      
2.3.1 Power control in voice cellular networks 
The main goal of power control in the voice networks is to ensure that each mobile 
station receives SIR above a certain threshold value (Gunnarsson & Gustafsson, 2002;  
Lee et al., 2003; Gunnarsson, 2000).  Distributed power control (DPC) is one of the 
most important and practical schemes of power control because each mobile station can 
adjust its transmission power level using only local information. Zander, (1992a), 
proposed a distributed balancing (DB) power control algorithm based on the SIR. The 



















                                         (2.15) 
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where  is the smaller controller parameter, )(ki and 
)1( k
ip are the SIR and power of 
the thi user at thk and th)1( k  time step.  The algorithm in (Zander, 1992a) converges 
to the balancing power vector which corresponds to
* when the thermal noise is 
neglected. Since the DB algorithm is based on )(ki , at first sight it appears to be 
distributed. However, it turn out that the problem is in the choice of the parameter   
because it may make p deviate towards zero or infinity. Thus, the DB power control 
algorithm is not a fully distributed algorithm.   
Grandhi and his co-authors proposed a modified version of the DB algorithm called 












                                                   (2.16) 
This algorithm also shows that it can converge to the power vector p when the 
thermal noise neglected. The simulation of the DPC algorithm indicated that the 
convergence speed is faster than the DB algorithm. Furthermore, simulation results 
from Lee et al., (1995) and Zander, (1994) also show that the DPC algorithm achieves 
better performance than the DB algorithm. The DPC algorithm still has the same 
problem of normalizing the powers by adapting  . Another similar work to the above 



















i pp                                             (2.17) 
where   is a constant parameter. The CDPC-II algorithm also has the same problem 
about how to choose  and if 1 gives the same algorithm as that proposed by 
Grandhi et al. (1994).  The disadvantage of these algorithms is that they are not fully 
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distributed. All of these algorithms require signalling for the normalization procedure, 
which is undesirable in practice.    
Foschini and Miljanic (1993) were the first to propose a framework of uplink power 
control where all users converge to the Pareto-optimal solution whenever they can 
achieve the required QoS that refers to SIRs. They proved the convergence of the DPC 
algorithm in equation (2.7) in the existence of thermal noise and they mentioned that the 
normalization procedure was unnecessary. The DPC algorithm is rewritten by replacing 












                                                 (2.18) 
where is the target SIR. Equation (2.9) can be implemented in a distributed manner, 
where )1( kip is the transmit power of the thi link at the thk time instant. Each independent 
link measures its current SIR, )(ki  and tries to achieve its target SIR in the next step 
(Bambos, 1998). The algorithm increases the transmit power of the link when the 
current SIR is below the target and decreases it when the current SIR is higher than the 
target. The disadvantage of the DPC algorithm is the case of an infeasible target SIR, in 
which the transmit power diverges to infinity.     
An interesting extension of the DPC algorithm has been proposed by Grandhi et al. 
(1994), who considered the system with output power constraints. The algorithm of the 
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where maxip is the maximum transmit power of the thi user. 









Figure 2.5: Control block diagram of CDPC 
Nevertheless, some users with CDPC in equation (2.10) may hit their maximum 
transmit power at some time instant k  with )(ki  and this may result in 
)(k
i for
0k , i.e., a user cannot satisfy the constraint of the SIR when it uses its maximum 
budget of power. In this case, some users can satisfy )(ki for some 0k and their 
power will converge to a feasible solution, whereas the other users that cannot achieve 
the target SIRwill continue to transmit at maximum power (Chiang et al., 2008).    
Yates, (1995) proposed a general framework for uplink power control by designing 




                                                 (2.20) 
where Tn pIpIpIpI )](,...),(),([)( 21 , and )( pI i is the interference experienced by 





































that exists) that satisfies the target SIR if the interference function )( pI is a standard and 
satisfies the following definition of power vectors p  and p .  
Definition 2.9: (Yates, 1995): 
 The interference function )( pI is a standard function if it satisfies the following three 
conditions  
1) Positivity 0)( pI , 
2) Monotonicity if pp  , then )()( pIpI  , 
3) Scalability 1 , then )()( pIpI     
The second-order constrained power control algorithm has been described by Jäntti 
& Kim (2000) , in which the update of transmission power is depend on the past and 































           (2.21) 
where 
kw is a non-increasing sequence of control parameters satisfying 21  kw .  
 El-Osery & Abdallah; (2000) designed a power control algorithm based on Linear 
Quadratic (LQ) control in order to achieve a faster convergence time and higher channel 
capacity. The power updated command is computed as 
  )()1(max)1( ,min kikiiki Ispp                                       (2.22) 







 and )(ki is an input to each subsystem that depends on 
the total interference produced by other users. 
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Similarly, Lv (2003) proposed the exponential function of the SIR in the power 
update equation to speed up the convergence. The fast constrained distributed power 
control is as follows: 




















                                      (2.24) 
where q  is the exponential parameter. 
2.3.2 Power control in wireless data networks 
The QoS objective of a mobile station in wireless voice systems is to achieve a 
minimum acceptable SIR to maximize the number of conversations where the 
transmission errors are tolerable (Goodman & Mandayam, 2000). The target level of 
SIR is dependent on the system, for example 18 dB in the analog system, the target 
can be low as 7 dB in the global system for mobile communications (GSM) digital 
system, and it is in the order of 6 dB in the code division multiple access CDMA 
system (Goodman & Mandayam, 2000). A utility function has been used in wireless 
data networks as a measure of the satisfaction experienced by a user. Thus, the utility 
function that is represented by the SIR in voice systems can be sketched as shown in 
Figure 2.3. The system will be unacceptable (utility=0) if the SIR is below the target ; 
otherwise when the SIR is greater than  the utility is constant (utility=1).  
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Figure 2.6: Quality of service metric for wireless voice represented as a utility 
function  
The QoS that refers to the SIR is no longer appropriate in wireless data networks 
because error-free communication has a high priority (Saraydar et al., 2002).   
 Therefore, the concepts of microeconomics and game theory have been used 
recently to define the users’ QoS in terms of the utility (cost) function rather than the 
SIR (Popescu & Chronopoulos, 2005).  
To model the problems of resource allocation in wireless networks using game 
theory, strategy sets should be defined in the basic form. However, the number of 
strategies changes depending on the number of resources. For example, in the problem 
of a joint power and rate control game, two strategies are defined, namely the 
transmission rate strategy and transmission power strategy. Each user adjusts its 
transmit rate from the transmit rate strategy, then adjusts its transmit power from the 
transmission power strategy to maximize their own utility function. 














In wireless data networks, the user maximizes its own utility function by choosing 
the action from the strategy set, such as the choice of its transmit-power, transmissions 
rate, modulation, packet size, multi-user receiver, multi-antenna processing algorithm, 
or carrier allocation strategy (Meshkati et al., 2007).  Users access the wireless networks 
through multiple access interference (shared medium) so each user is a source of 
interference to others. The strategy chosen by each user affects the performance of other 
users in the network.  
Regarding game theory, there are several important things that the engineering 
designer has to consider. Firstly, a choice of a suitable utility (or cost) function that has 
physical meaning (such as energy efficiency or spectrum efficiency, SIR balancing), 
and the utility function has to be either quasi-concave or quasi-convex. Secondly, there 
should be a strategy set in the game from which the user must choose its action in order 
to maximize its utility function. Finally, the game must have a steady state solution 
(Nash equilibrium) where no user can unilaterally maximize his utility and this solution 
is unique (Meshkati et al., 2007). 
In the non-cooperative power control game, each user harms and affects other users’ 
resources because there is no cooperation between them. The outcome Nash equilibrium 
in this case is inefficient. The pricing technique is an efficient tool that has been used by 
researchers and engineers to solve the inefficiency problem of the Nash equilibrium. 
The Pareto optimal solution can be calculated using the optimization technique, in 
which the net utility function (utility - price) represents the objective function. Figure 
2.4 explains the phenomenon of the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. 
 The most popular pricing function used in the power control game is based on the 
user’s transmit power, where all users in the system have an incentive to transmit at low 
power. When users transmit at low power, the amount of interference will decrease and 
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this is one of the main goals of cognitive radio networks, where the unlicensed users 







Figure 2.7: Inefficiency of Nash equilibrium 
Here, we have explained that the power control algorithms obtained by using game 
theory and based on the cost function have two terms. The first term looks like the 
CDPC in equation (2.9) and the second term is dependent on the pricing function 
applied in the utility or cost function. The main goal of using a cost function is to design 
SIR balancing schemes, in which all users try to achieve the same target value of the 
SIR.  Figure 2.5 explains the block diagram of power control algorithms of voice and 
data networks (based on cost function) and the differences between the blocks in both 
approaches from control theory perspective. Both the power control block diagram from 
a control theory perspective for the CDPC and the power control block diagram from 
game theory when using cost functions are shown in the following figure with some of 




























Figure 2.8: Power control blocks from a control perspective. 
 
2.3.2.1 Utility function concepts 
The choice of the utility function is very important when game theory is employed to 
solve the problem of power control and resource allocation in wireless data networks. 
Two types of services that the next generation wireless networks must be able to support 
are voice and data services. Voice and video teleconferencing (real time) are examples 
of delay sensitive and error tolerant services, while Web browsing and file downloading 
(non-real time) are examples of delay tolerant services and are error sensitive. 
In wireless data networks, the SIR influences the probability of transmission errors. 
When   is very high, the probability of transmission errors approaches zero, and the 
utility function rises to a constant value, whereas when  is very low, the probability of 
transmission errors increases and the utility function is near zero. Therefore, the utility 
function for wireless data networks could be characterized as a concave function. 
The distributed power control algorithms used in wireless voice systems are not 
appropriate for use in wireless data systems. This is due to the difference between the 
utility function in voice service and data service systems.  
Distributed Power Control (CDPC) (S. A. 









Distributed Power Control obtained from cost functions 












A lot of literature has proposed different utility functions to solve the power control 
and resource allocation problems depending on the main concern of their work. Energy 
efficiency was the main concern of the utility function that was proposed by Goodman 
& Mandayam, (2000), which was defined as the number of information bits that can be 
transmitted successfully per joule of energy consumed. An energy-efficient utility 
function was also used by Saraydar et al. (2002) and Meshkati et al. (2007). This utility 
function depends on the signal to interference ratio (SIR) and transmission power of a 
given terminal.  
To transmit data successfully at a low bit error rate, the SIR level has to be high at 
the output of the receiver. However, achieving a high SIR level requires mobile 
terminals to expend a high level energy, which in turn results in low battery life. The net 
number of information bits that can be transmitted without error per unit time is referred 
to as the throughput. In this case, the utility function can be defined as the ratio between 






u                                                   (2.25) 
where L and M are the information bits and the length of packet, respectively and ip
is the transmission power of user i . The throughput iT  here can be expressed as: 
)( iii fRT                                                 (2.26) 
where iR  and i are the transmission rate and the SIR for the user i  respectively, and 
)( if  is the efficiency function, which represents the packet success rate (PSR). The 
efficiency function depends on data transmission such as modulation, coding, and 
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packet size. The efficiency function that depends on the modulation scheme can be 
expressed as 
M
ei Pf )1()(                                             (2.27) 
where eP  is the bit error rate BER of terminal i .  Table 2.2 explains the BER as a 
function of various modulation schemes 
Table 2.2: The BER as a function of various modulation schemes 
Modulation scheme BER 
Binary phase shift keying BPSK  2Q  





Coherent frequency shift keying FSK  Q  






The frame success rate efficiency function in equation (2.18) is shown in Figure 2.6 
for non-coherent frequency shift keying (FSK) for the packet length 80M  . 
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Figure 2.9: Efficiency function non-coherent frequency shift keying (FSK), 80.M   
 











                                             (2.28) 
Saraydar et al. (2002) also introduced the pricing function to improve the Nash 
equilibrium as a function of power transmission: 
iii pcpc )(                                                    (2.29) 
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For  perfect  error  detection  and  no  error  correction,  the frame  success  rate  
(FSR)  can  be expressed  as Mec PP )1(  , where eP  decreases  monotonically  with 
the SIR in all modulation schemes. Consequently, cP is a monotonically increasing 
function of the SIR. Therefore, cP can be expressed as a function of the SIR and used as 
the utility function in equation (2.19).  For  all  modulation  schemes,  when 0p ,  the  
best  strategy  for  the receiver  is  to  make  a  guess  for  each  bit,  resulting  in 
M
cP
 2 , and resulting  in  infinite utility (Saraydar et al., 2002). The efficiency 
function )( if  and the FSR closely follow the behaviour of the probability of correct 
reception while producing 0cP  at 0p  (Saraydar et al., 2002). The close curves 
between the efficiency function )( if  and the FSR cP for the non-coherent FSK 
modulation scheme are demonstrated in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.10: FSR and efficiency as a function of terminal SIR for a non-coherent 
FSK scheme. 




























In the studies of Alpcan  et al. (2002) and Gunturi & Paganini (2003), the main goal 
of a utility function was to maximize the spectral efficiency, and they defined the utility 
function as a logarithmic concave function of the user’s signal to interference ratio 
(SIR), i.e., 
iiii pcBu  )1log(                                             (2.31) 
where B is the communication bandwidth, i is the SIR of user i  and ic  is the pricing 
factor of user i . The term ii pc is the linear pricing of the user’s transmit-power. 
Xiao et al. (2003) defined the utility function of the user as a sigmoid function of the 
user’s SIR. The pricing function was also defined as a linear function of the user’s 
transmit-power, and the difference between the sigmoid function and pricing function 
was defined as the net utility function, i.e. 
iiiii pcuNU  )(                                             (2.32) 
where )( iiu  is the sigmoid function and ic is the pricing factor. The efficiency 









)(                                                 (2.33) 
where a  is a sigmoid parameter. 




  that is used in 
equation (2.19) and the efficiency function iai ef
  11)(2 that is used in the sigmoid 
utility function equation (2.23) is shown in Figure 2.8., where 10a  is assumed in 
equation )(2 if  . 
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Figure 2.11: Efficiency function )(1 if  and )(2 if  as a function of SIR 
2.3.2.2 Power control game based on utility function 
The power control game has been used in several works based on utility and pricing 
functions. MacKenzie & Wicker (2001) offer motivations for using game theory to 
study communication systems, and in specific power control. Goodman & Mandayam 
(2000), Meshkati et al. (2007) and  Ji & Huang (1998) proposed a power control as a 
non-cooperative game in which users choose their transmit powers in order to maximize 
their utilities, where utility is defined as the ratio of throughput to transmit power.  
 Goodman & Mandayam (2001) proposed a network assisted power control scheme 
in order to improve the overall utility of the system. The pricing function has been 
introduced in Saraydar et al. (2001) and Saraydar et al. (2002) to obtain a more efficient 
solution for the power control game. Similar approaches are taken in Xiao et al. (2003), 
Zhou et al. (2004), and Sung & Wong (2003) with different designs of utility function. 
Feng et al. (2004) discussed a joint network-centric and user-centric power control. 
Meshkati et al. (2005) propose a power control game for multi-carrier CDMA systems. 














































Ghasemi et al. (2006) proposed a new pricing function for power control in wireless 
data networks based on the linear signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) instead 
of power. An overview and more details of game theory approaches for resource 
allocations in wireless data networks have been presented by Meshkati et al. (2007).   
2.3.2.3 Power control game based on cost function 
Recently, many researchers have used the cost function in their works to study the 
problem of power control in wireless data networks.  Alpcan et al. (2002) defined the 
user cost function as the difference between the utility function and its pricing function. 
Alpcan’s cost function was logarithmically dependent on the SIR and linear in power 
and the objectives were to minimize the users cost. Accordingly, the cost function of the 
thi  user is defined as 
)1ln(),( iiiiiii bpcppJ                                (2.34) 
where ip  is the vector of power levels of all users except user i , ib is the user-specific 
utility parameter. 
The cost function proposed by Koskie & Gajic (2005) consists of a weighted sum of 
the linear power and square of SIR error. The cost function of the thi  user is defined as 
iiiiiiii pbcppJ 
2)(),(                                  (2.35) 
The resulting algorithm (obtaining by setting partial cost derivatives to zero to satisfy 
the necessary conditions for equilibrium) is given in terms of the previous power value 
)(k
ip and current SIR measurement 
)(k








































p                        (2.36) 
Note that the first term on the right hand side of (2.27) is equal to the right hand side 
of the power balancing algorithm (2.7). The second term is always negative for non-
zero power, so the Nash equilibrium powers will always be less than those generated by 
the power balancing algorithm. The ratio ii cb , chosen by the mobile to represent its 
relative cost weights, determines the magnitude of the power savings. The power 
control algorithm proposed by Koskie & Gajic (2005) can be represented by using a 







 Figure 2.12: Control block diagram of the power control algorithm (Koskie & Gajic 
2005)  
The algorithm proposed by Koskie & Gajic (2005) has been accelerated by using 








   














































Pasandshanjani et al. (2011) proposed a new cost function to design the power 
control algorithm. The cost function proposed in their work consists of a weighted sum 
of the linear power and the hyperbolic function of the SIR error. The cost function of 
the thi  user is defined as 
iiiiiiii pbcppJ  )cosh(),(                                     (2.37) 
The resulting algorithm (obtaining by setting partial cost derivatives to zero to satisfy 
the necessary conditions for equilibrium) is given in terms of the previous power value 
)(k
ip and current SIR measurement 
)(k













































p                 (2.38) 
There are many works that have used the cost function to design the power control 
game in cognitive radio networks as well as wireless networks and these will be listed in 
the next subsections. 
2.3.3 Power control game in modern wireless networks 
In this context, we shall briefly review some of the non-cooperative power control 
games applied in modern wireless networks such as cognitive radio and femtocell 
networks. In both cognitive radio and femtocell networks, there are two priority levels 
for users: 
1. Primary users (PUs) in cognitive radio networks are the high priority users 
to access the available channels and guarantee their own QoS, because of 
their ownership property of the licensed spectrum. Similarly, macrocell 
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users (MUs) in two-tier femtocell networks are also high priority access 
users in the network from the same reasons as above.  
2. Cognitive radios (CRs) or secondary users (SUs) are the low priority access 
users in the network because only unused parts of spectrum can be assigned 
to them and for this reason, QoS should be not guaranteed and can be 
adjustable. On the other hand, femtocell users (FUs) share the licensed 
spectrum with MUs and are low priority users because they work in low 
range cells. 
    In this case, extravagant use of transmit power by low priority users will cause 
undesirable (harmful) interference to the QoS of high priority users during spectrum 
sharing. Therefore, a strict power control algorithm should be run in low priority users 
(CRs and FUs) devices to protect other users and utilize the spectrum efficiently.  
In the previous subsections, the power control proposed for wireless data networks 
based on game theory and utility functions has been reviewed. The power control 
algorithms that were used in wireless data networks may not be directly applicable for 
cognitive radio and femtocell networks unless the interference temperature limit and 
cross-tier interference limit at the licensed (high priority) receiver is considered. Utility 
and cost functions have been defined in different formats to achieve the QoS 
requirement of both types of users. Researchers and engineering network designers take 
into consideration the high priority of users who own the licensed spectrum (primary 
and macrocell users) in which their QoS should be guaranteed forever.  
In power control, the QoS can be guaranteed for users by specifying a particular 
value of the SIR referred to as the ―target of minimum SIR‖, whereby users should 
achieve the same as this target or higher. On the other hand, the QoS of low priority 
users such as secondary and femtocell users can be slightly varied below the target SIR, 
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depending on the status of the system. A forced decrease in low priority users’ SIR is 
due to the increase of interference and the decreasing QoS of high priority users.     
2.3.3.1 Power control game in cognitive radio networks 
As discussed before that power  control  algorithms  that  were  used  in wireless  
data  networks  may  not  be  directly  applicable  for  cognitive  radio  networks unless 
the interference temperature limit at the licensed receiver is considered. The interference 
temperature limit in a cognitive radio network is the limit of interference that the PU 
can tolerate without significant deterioration in the QoS.   
In the context of the cost function, Li et al. (2011) proposed a new power control 
game based on the cost function and the target of the transmit power has been included, 
such as the target SIR. The cost function in Li et al. (2011) is defined as a weighted sum 
of the logarithm of SIR error and the logarithm of power error. The algorithm has many 
advantages, such as fast convergence, better anti-noise performance and capacity. In 
addition, Junhui et al., (2013) proposed a non-cooperative power control algorithm also 
based on the cost function similar to Li et al. (2011) by using the square root function 
instead of the logarithm to fast algorithm. Lu et al. (2012) proposed a power control 
game in CDMA cognitive radio networks based on the cost function and they used two 
SIR thresholds in order to adjust the interference factor of power and improve the 
fairness. Jiao et al., (2013) investigated how to decide the transmission power levels of 
cognitive radio users using non-cooperative game theory. They proposed a novel cost 
function, in which the thresholds of the SINR and transmission power level were 
considered. Their algorithm’s numerical results indicated better performance in terms of 
anti-noise.    
Al-Gumaei et al., (2014) proposed a new SIR-based sigmoid power control game in 
cognitive radio networks based on the cost function. The cost function is defined as a 
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weighted sum of the square of the signal to interference ratio (SIR) error and a sigmoid 
weighting factor of power, in which the results show a considerable saving on transmit 
power compared to the relevant algorithms. The block diagram of the SIR-based 
sigmoid power control game is illustrated in Figure 2.10. The power control formula is 








Figure 2.13: Block diagram of SIR-based power control algorithm based on sigmoid 
function Al-Gumaei et al. (2014) 
Al Talabani et al. (2015) proposed a new chaos based cost function to design the 
power control algorithm and analysed the dynamic spectrum sharing issue in the uplink 
of cellular CRNs. The chaos cost function is defined by taking into the account the 
interference from and the interference tolerance of the primary users. The algorithm led 
to significantly lower power consumption and fast convergence.   
More details and explanation for the concept of game theory and its application in 
cognitive radio networks is given by Wang et al. (2010). Lasaulce et al., (2009) 








   














































improve the individual energy efficiency of all of the users. The pricing issue of the 
uplink power control game has been studied by Yu et al. (2010), where the CRs adjust 
their transmission power levels to maximize their own utilities, and the primary service 
charges the CRs on their transmitted power level to enhance its own income. Buzzi & 
Saturnino (2011) considered a non-cooperative power control game for maximum 
energy efficiency with a fairness constraint on the maximum received powers for the 
CRs, in which the results obtained indicate that the CRs have a beneficial impact on the 
whole network throughput. Channel and power allocation has been proposed and 
evaluated by Gállego (2012) using game theory based on local information, in which the 
problem is analysed under the interference model. The no-regret learning algorithm has 
also been used to overcome the convergence limitations of the local game and perform 
joint channel and power allocation.  
The utility function via pricing has also been considered in recent years to solve the 
problem of power control in cognitive radio networks. In 2010,  Al-Gumaei & Dimyati 
(2010a) proposed a new pricing function for secondary users (SUs) as a function of 
transmit power and the square amount of interference in order to guide SUs to an 
efficient Nash equilibrium point. The simulation results indicate that the proposed 
power control game, via a new pricing function, can maximize the number of SUs that 
are able to access the unused spectrum and improve the utilities of both PU and SUs. In 
another work, Y. Al-Gumaei & Dimyati (2010b) formulated the power control game as 
a non-cooperative game, in which the first player is the primary user (PU). The number 
of SUs in the system is limited by the status of the PU and its ability to achieve its QoS 
rather than using the interference temperature limits. The numerical results show that 
the proposed power control algorithm with pricing reduces the power consumed by the 
PU and SU terminals, and improves the utility functions of the PU and SUs.  
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 Zhang et al. (2012) introduced the concept of the target SIR to modify the utility, 
and they modified the Shuffled Frog Leaping Algorithm (SFLA) to improve the 
accuracy of the solution. For Kuo et al., (2013) the power control game has been 
improved based on the outage probability of the PU in a spectrum-underlay CRN.  
In addition, Kuo et al. (2013) designed an efficient swarm intelligent algorithm to 
improve the convergence speed and improve the energy-efficiency. A payment-based 
power control scheme based on a non-cooperative power control game has been 
considered by  Xie et al. (2014), in which the distance of the CRs and SIR were used as 
a reference for punishment price setting.  
2.3.3.2 Power control game in femtocell networks   
Over the last decades, the demand for wireless data has increased dramatically, 
causing a significant change in the resource allocation of wireless networks. The 
increasing capacity and the limitation of link budget issues have been solved by relying 
on cell splitting or additional carriers but these techniques are complex and iterative 
(Saad et al., 2013). Moreover, the cost of these techniques and the updated 
infrastructures will be assigned to the service providers. 
Recent measurements and studies of data usage found that the majority of data traffic 
originates indoor; it is estimated that more than 70% of calls and over 90% of data 
services originated indoors (Chandrasekhar et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2011). Therefore, 
femtocells have attracted much attention as a promising technique to solve the 
increasing network capacity. A femtocell is a small indoor access point, known as a 
home base station (HBS), that can be purchased by a customer and installed as a 
wireless data access point at home (Zhang et al., 2012).  Femtocell or home base station 
(HBS) is a low-range, low-power, low-cost and consumer owned device that is installed 
inside houses and offices. The HBS connects to the internet via an IP backhaul, such as 
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a digital subscriber line (DSL), cable, or worldwide interoperability for microve access 
(WIMAX). There are two approaches for spectrum allocation between the macrocell 
and femtocell users: 
(i) Spectrum splitting,  
(ii) Spectrum sharing.  
In a two tier femtocell network, the spectrum sharing approach is commonly used 
due to the scarcity of available spectrum and the absence of coordination between the 
macrocell and femtocell, as well as between femtocells (Kang et al., 2012).  
 The macrocell is accordingly supposed to be modelled as primary infrastructure, 
because the operator’s foremost obligation is to ensure that an outdoor cellular user 
achieves its required SINR target at its BS, despite cross-tier femtocell interference. 
Indoor users act in their self-interest to maximize their SINRs, but incur an SINR 
penalty because they cause cross-tier interference (Chandrasekhar et al., 2008). 
The problem of spectrum sharing in the two tier femtocell networks has become a 
technical challenge to scientists and researchers. The implementation of distributed 
interference management is the main challenge in femtocell networks due to the limited 
capacity of the signalling wire-line network (e.g., DSL links) and the difference in 
access priority between MUEs and FUEs (Jo et al., 2009; Güvenç et al., 2008). The 
existence of indoor femtocells causes power control to create dead zones, leading to 
non-uniform coverage.  
To mitigate cross-tier interference and guarantee QoS for both MUEs and FUEs, an 
efficient distributed power control is necessary in both systems. Closed loop power 
control is commonly used in wireless networks, and consists of a two algorithms loop: 
(i) an outer loop algorithm that updates the threshold signal-to-interference-noise-ratio 
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(SINR) every 10 ms, and (ii) an inner loop algorithm which computes the required 
powers based on the SINR measurements and is updated every 1.25 ms. The outer loop 
algorithm determines the target SINR based on the estimate of the frame error rate 
(FER). On the other hand, the inner loop algorithm generates a power control bit based 
on the difference between the actual and target SINR and it sends the command to the 
mobile via transmit power control (TPC) (Koskie & Gajic, 2005).  
Several works have considered the problem of interference mitigation and power 
control for spectrum sharing femtocells networks.  The concepts of microeconomics and 
game theory have been used recently to define the users’ QoS in terms of the utility 
(cost) function in two tier femtocell networks.  
Several power control schemes based on game theory have been investigated 
previously by  Ji & Huang (1998) and Alpcan et al. (2002) are applied in femtocell 
networks. The output of the game in most cases is the Nash equilibrium of the power 
control game. In addition, pricing techniques are also introduced previously to improve 
the Pareto efficiency of the Nash equilibrium (Koskie & Gajic, 2005; Xiao et al., 2003; 
Saraydar et al., 2001; Saraydar et al., 2002) and also applied in femtocell network. The 
problem of interference in femtocell network similar to cognitive radio network can be 
also solved using game theory. The game theory approach has been considered to solve 
the problem of interference in cognitive radio networks  (Jayaweera & Li, 2009; Al-
Gumaei & Dimyati, 2010a; Li et al., 2011;  Al-Gumaei et al., 2014). In cognitive radio 
networks, unlicensed users (cognitive users) are enabled to adaptively access the 
frequency channels, considering the current state of the external radio environment (Hu 
et al., 2014).  
In femtocell networks, several works also have been considered to mitigate the cross-
tier interference (Kang et al., 2012; Ngo et al., 2012; Han et al., 2013; Xie et al., 2013). 
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Moreover, the game theory-based power control has been considered for HetNet small 
cell networks (Xu et al., 2014). The authors addressed the mitigation of the cross-tier 
interference problem by ensuring the protection of macrocell users. 
A utility based distributed SINR adaptation was studied in the two tier femtocell 
networks to alleviate the cross-tier interference (Chandrasekhar et al., 2009). Each 
femtocell user maximizes their individual utility consisting of a SINR based reward less 
an incurred cost. Their results show 30% improvenment in mean femtocell SINRs and 
the algorithm ensures that a cellular user achieves its SINR target even with 100 
femtocells/cell site and requires a worst case SINR reduction of only 16% at femtocells. 
  Xie et al. (2012a) and  Xie et al. (2012b), studied the energy efficient spectrum 
sharing and resource allocation in cognitive radio with femtocells. They used a gradient 
based iteration algorithm has been proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium 
solution. The non-cooperative power control game is also used for interference 
mitigation in the two-tier femtocell networks in Douros et al. (2012). The output  results 
indicate that the application of power control by distinguishing the utility functions 
based on the users’ QoS requirements leads in many cases of interest to a smooth 
coexistence in a two-tier femtocell network. The energy efficient power control 
algorithm is derived in the interference limited two-tier femtocell networks (Lu et al., 
2012).  The proposed scheme was evaluated to enhance energy efficiency of two-tier 
femtocell networks, while mitigating inter-tier interference for the uplink.  The scheme 
also can guarantee that cellular user can achieve its target SINR. The differentiated 
pricing based on the SINR is considered in Zhang et al. (2012), in which the uplink 
power allocation is considered as a non-cooperative game. Simulation results show that 
the proposed power control scheme is effective in improving the outage and throughput 
performance of macrocell users while the effects on femtocell users are acceptable. 
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CHAPTER 3: A NEW SIR-BASED SIGMOID POWER CONTROL IN 




The recent development in wireless networks applications and services has led to a 
decrease in radio spectrum resources availability of the network. However, spectrum 
professional researchers and developers have found out that licensed spectrum is still 
underutilized in some locations and times (Marcus et al.  2002). Cognitive Radio (CR) 
is a promising technology that leads to optimal use of radio spectrum by allowing 
unlicensed users access to the unused parts (holes) of the licensed spectrum. Cognitive 
radios (CRs) that access the licensed spectrum are interference sources to other high 
priority licensed users. Therefore, CRs may not cause any undue interference to licensed 
users by keeping interference below the interference threshold level, commonly referred 
to as the ―interference temperature‖ limit TLI  (Haykin, 2005). Interference resulting 
from cognitive radios (CRs) is the most important aspect of cognitive radio networks 
that leads to degradation in Quality of Service (QoS) in both primary and CR systems. 
Each active user (CR or primary user) contributes to the interference affecting other 
users, so an efficient power control algorithms are essential in CR devices for achieving 
both system objectives (quality of service and system capacity). 
Power Control (PC) in wireless networks has been widely considered in the past and 
recent years as an essential mechanism to maintain Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR). 
This in turn achieves the required Quality-of-Service (QoS) metrics, such as data rate 
and throughput (Hossain et al., 2009). In addition, PC can reduce the co-channel 
interference and extends the battery life in the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 
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systems, because each mobile device consumes minimum power needed to maintain the 
required SIR. 
Closed-loop power control is widely used in wireless communication networks to 
maintain users’ SIR and to reduce mobile power consumption. Closed-loop power 
control structure in standard IS-95 consists of an outer loop power control and inner 
loop power control as shown in Figure 3.1. 
The outer loop power control received QoS requirement and then decides the suitable 
target SIR for the connection. It is noted that the target SIR value is not equal to the 
minimum required SIR for the current QoS level due to the variation in the radio 
channel. The value of actual SIR is varying around the target SIR, and to avoid constant 
outage, the target SIR must be larger than the minimum required SIR.     
   The inner loop power control receives the target SIR, which is based on the 
feedback from the received signal quality estimation.  The difference between the target 
and the quality estimate values of SIR is computed in order to increment or decrement 
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In this chapter, we proposed a novel cost function in underlay scenario for cognitive 
radios that consists of a weighted sum of power and square function of SIR error based 
on sigmoid function. As a rule, the cost function for the power control formula in this 
work also has two terms. The utility term is used to generate a similar DPC algorithm, 
and the second is the price term that includes the sigmoid function.  
Important features of the proposed sigmoid power control scheme are: 
(i) the ability to maintain the required QoS of all CRs efficiently with 
insignificant reduction in SIR,  
(ii) the algorithm can be practically implemented in a distributive manner 
without requiring additional information from BS,  
(iii) a significant decrease and better fairness in mobile power consumption. 
The novelty of the proposed sigmoid power control scheme is the sigmoid-based cost 
function. The choice of the proposed sigmoid based cost function is the key to enable 
each CR to choose its transmitting power efficiently. It guides cognitive users to choose 
lower power level to achieve their required QoS compared to other algorithms. 
Furthermore, we explained in this chapter the variation between power control 
algorithms obtained from control theory and game theory concepts, and we presented 
these algorithms depending on the channel status. In addition, the proposed algorithm 
has an advantage that can be practically implemented in a distributive manner without 
requiring additional information.  
The rest of this chapter is as follows: section 3.2 describes the system model of 
cognitive radio, the distributed power control and the game model of the proposed 
power control algorithm in section 3.3 and presents the numerical results and discussion 
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in section 3.4.  Acceleration of a sigmoid power control game using Newton method has 
been proposed in section 3.5. In section 3.6, we concluded this chapter.   
 System model 3.2
Consider a system of a single cell wireless cognitive radio CDMA network in 
which N CRs share the same licensed spectrum with primary users. For simplicity, there 
is one CR base station that serves N CRs. Let ip be the transmit power of thi cognitive 
user and ih is the attenuation from thi cognitive user to the base station. The attenuation 
is computed from the distance id between the thi CR and the cognitive base station to be 

ii dAh / with neglected shadowing and fast fading effects, where A  is a constant gain 
and is the path loss factor that is usually between 2 and 6. Figure 3.2 illustrates a 
simple system model of cognitive radio network.   
In this chapter, we consider only the uplink power control case and it is assumed 














                                      (3.1) 
where i is the target SIR, i is the background noise, and ijc is the correlation 
coefficient. The denominator of equation (3.1) represents the sum of interference 
including background noise and it can be denoted as )( iiI p , where ip  is the vector of 
power for all CRs except the thi user. Thus, equation (3.1) can be rewritten similar to a 
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where ijg  is an effective link gain from the thi user to the base station. The subscript 
i  indicates the interference that depends on the power of all users except the thi user. 














                                               (3.3) 
where ijg denote to an effective link gain from the thj cognitive user to the base 
station that specifies the thj  user’s contribution to the interference affecting the signal 










Figure 3.2: System model of cognitive radio networks 
 
In spectrum trading, the objective of primary system that owns the spectrum rights 











with large numbers of CRs. The profit maximizing objective should be set under the 
constraint on limited performance degradation of primary users or the interference 
temperature limit (Hossain et al., 2009). For this, the total interference produced from 
cognitive radios should be less than the interference temperature limit and this condition 




Igp  1 ,0                                            (3.4) 
where ig ,0 is the channel gain from the transmitter of cognitive radio i to the 
measurement point of the primary system, and TLI is the interference temperature limit. 
Due to the competition of many cognitive radio networks to share the unused 
spectrum, it is assumed that the primary system has an intelligent admission control 
policy that will only accept the lowest interference CR network. Therefore, a new power 
control algorithm for cognitive radio networks has been considered in this work to 
guarantee lower interference and thus obtaining high priority in the admission control of 
the primary system.    
To simplify the presentation and analysis, we also further introduce a user-specific 
notation i  as a ratio of interference to the link gain of cognitive user i  as in (Xiao et 














p                                           (3.5) 
The value of i represents the channel status of cognitive user i ; a higher interference 
and a lower path gain results in a higher i . The poor channel of cognitive user i  results 
in a higher value of i , while the good channel results in a lower value of i . In 
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(Foschini & Miljanic, 1993), the user i  maintains its SIR at a target level i , and the 















                                      (3.6) 
where )(ki is the channel status of cognitive user i at the thk time step. 
 The unconstrained power control in equation (3.6) converges to a fixed point if the 
target SIR vector is feasible and all users can achieve their target SIR with minimal 
transmit power. On the other hand, if the target SIR vector is infeasible, then there is no 
transmit power vector that can satisfy SIR requirement for all users. Distributed power 
control (DPC) in (3.6) has been improved by Grandhi et al., (1994) to the constrained 
power control in order to solve the problem of divergence in infeasible case, that is, 
 max)()1( ,min iikiki pp                                           (3.7) 
where maxip is the maximum constrained transmit power. The control block diagram 
of constrain distributed power control (CDPC) which related to the symbol i  is shown 








































3.2.1 Motivating example: 
In this example, we study and explain the effect of slight reduction of SIR to the 
power level of users.  
















Let assume that the background noise be 2321 10
  , and assume that all 
mobile terminals want to achieve a target 5321  . Note that the value of the 
target SIR is corresponding to 7 dB. 
By applying the distributed power control (DPC) algorithm (SIR balancing 
algorithm) to these mobiles and running the algorithm 400 iterations, we obtained the 
last values of SIR and power as follows 
]9997.4,9997.4,9997.4[  
]0989.4,7091.12,3844.6[p  
It is found that all mobile users achieve their target SIR with different level of power 
depending on channel gain and interference. When we slightly reduced some values of 
the target SIR of some users and run the simulation test again, we found that the levels 
of user’s powers are significantly reduced.  
We adjusted the target SIR (slightly less) many times and re-run the simulation and 
then record the values of transmit power of all users.  
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 The power level results of the three mobile users with different values of target SIR 
are summarized in table 3.1.      
Table 3.1: Final power level to achieve target SIR vectors 
SIR target values 1p  2p  3p  
]00.5,00.5,00.5[  6.3844 12.7091 4.0898 
]95.4,95.4,00.5[  3.3987 6.7140 2.1725 
]90.4,90.4,00.5[  2.3051 4.5185 1.4702 
]80.4,90.4,00.5[  1.8223 3.5548 1.1467 
]80.4,80.4,00.5[  1.3948 2.6910 0.8855 
  
It is shown in the second row that small reduction (1%) of the target SIR of user 2 
and user 3 resulting in approximate 50% reduction of power consumed of all users. 
Moreover, if the reduction of SIR target is (4%) of user 2 and 3, the transmit power of 
all users is reduce approximately to 79%. The results in Table 3.1 propose a power 
control algorithm alternative to DPC which can slightly reduce SIR of users who use 
higher power level. In game theory, pricing technique is the efficient tool to achieve this 
objective. Linear pricing of power is the common function used in the literature to 
obtain the pareto optimal solution which represents the point that no user can improve 
its own utility without reducing others utilities.  
 Power control based on game model  3.3
The interaction and selfish behavior among CRs requires a suitable framework for 
analysis. Recently, game theory has been considered as one of the most efficient tool for 
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analyzing the interaction of decision makers. Game model in the basic form consists of 
three basic elements:  
(i) players or decision makers of the game,  
(ii) strategy or action space, and  
(iii) utility or cost function that represent preference of players. 
 Each player in a game selects its action from action space to maximize (or minimize 
cost) its own utility in a selfish manner. In CR networks, CR users can be considered as 
the decision makers of the game, network resources (power, data rate, etc.) are the 
strategy spaces of the game, and the utility function represents the preference (required 
QoS) of CR users. In this chapter, we defined the non-cooperative power control game 
of a CR system as follows: 
(.)}]{},{,[ ii JP                                                  (3.8) 
where },...,2,1{ N is the index set of players (CRs), ],0[
max
ii PP   represents the 
transmission power strategy set of user i , and maxiP is the maximum transmission power 
of user i . The cost function of user i  is referred to as (.)iJ , in which each CR tries to 
minimize its own cost function in a distributive manner. 
3.3.1 Cost function and Nash equilibrium derivation 
In subsections (2.2.2) and (2.2.3), we reviewed several cost functions that have 
been proposed to solve the problem of power control in wireless data networks. It is 
shown that most of cost functions were depending on the target SIR. 
Given a reference target SIR  i , power control is used to maintain the desired SIR 
based on the feedback of the error )()( pp iiie  .  
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The value of error )(pie may be either positive or negative sign and to avoid the 
negative case, this term should be square. To achieve the required target SIR, all CR try 
to minimize this error or maximize the negative of this error. Thus, we considered the 
objective (utility) of CR user as: 
 22 )()()( ppp iii eu                                  (3.9) 
To derive a power control algorithm for this utility function, each CR should 
maximize this utility and this is can be achieved at a point for which the partial 







































                
(3.10)
 

































                                               
(3.11)
 
It is shown that equation (3.11) is equivalent to DPC formula in (3.6) which can 
guarantee that all CR achieve the same value of target SIR. Therefore, a pricing 
technique is necessary to relax (slightly reduce) the target value of SIR to obtain 
significant reduction of consumed power.    
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Thus, we assume that the cost function of thi cognitive user is ))(,( piii pJ  , where 
the power vector is TNppp ],...,,[ 21p . The Nash equilibrium point(s) means that no 
user can improve its individual cost function unilaterally. Mathematically, for all Ni  





 )),...,,,,....,,(,())(,( 1121 p           (3.12)   
Thus, we introduce a new sigmoid based pricing function of power that can relax the 





























                           
(3.13)
 
where ib , ic  are the non-negative weighting factors, and a is the sigmoid factor. The 








ax                                         (3.14) 
The sigmoid function value varies between 0 and 1, and it is noted that the sigmoid 
function has a derivative function. Figure 3.4; explain the curves of sigmoid function 
),( ax  with different values of variable ,x and sigmoid parameter a . 
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Figure 3.4: Sigmoid function with different values of ,x and a  
 
The proposed cost function should be convex and nonnegative to allow existence of a 
nonnegative minimum.  
Thus, the proposed cost function can be written as the difference between pricing 
function and the utility function that expressed in (3.9) as 



































                    (3.15) 
 
It is shown from (3.15) that the cost function depends on the parameters ii cb , and the 
sigmoid parameter a . 


























The power update formula is obtained by applying the condition of a Nash 
equilibrium which is differentiating the cost function with respect to power and equating 







































































                            (3.16) 





























































ii ,                                          (3.17) 
It follows from (3.17) that as 0ib , the term of pricing will also decrease to 0 
according to (3.14), that is ii  .  On the other hand, as 0ic ,  i  will converges to 
the value of 1i . 
Substituting for i  in equation (3.2), and isolating ip , we can express the power 


























































iiii ,                                       (3.18) 
Substituting for the interference using (3.1) in (3.17) and evaluating at the Nash 








































Figure 3.5: Control Block diagram of the proposed sigmoid power control 
 
3.3.2 Power control algorithm 
According to equation (3.18), each CR user can update its power level using only 
the knowledge of its own interference level; therefore, this method can be implemented 
in a distributed manner. We assume that the algorithm is updated every step and 









   



































































                    (3.20) 





i p   is the channel status of the thi user that depends on the measured 
interference at the thk step of the algorithm.  
The control block diagram of the sigmoid power control is shown in Figure 3.5, 
which explain how the output of distributed power control ii has been processed by 
using the pricing factors and sigmoid function to obtain the final formula of the 
proposed power update formula. 
3.3.3 Convergence 
 Yates, (1995) shows that if the algorithm )(
)()1( kk pfp  converges to a fixed 
point, the function f should satisfy the following three conditions: 
1) Positivity ,0)( pf  
2) Monotonicity ),()( pfpfpp   
3) Scalability ).()(;1 pfpf       


























i ,)(                                (3.21) 










                                          (3.22) 
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Since 1)(1  i , if we choose a proper value for ii cb , the positivity condition can 
be easily met.  
The monotonicity condition can be proved by increasing the best response function 















































                         (3.23) 




























                        (3.24) 
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 . Therefore, for scalability, the 
positivity can be met and it is sufficient.  
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From the above analysis and according to the parameters, we can conclude that the 
power control function is a standard function and the algorithm converges to a unique 
Nash equilibrium point. 
3.3.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium 
In this subsection, a solution is presented for the Nash algorithm algebraic 
equations to guarantee the existence of a unique solution to the power update equation. 
The result is obtained by using the Implicit Function Theorem (Ortega & Rheinboldt, 
















































































     
(3.26)                 
According to the Implicit Function Theorem, the Jacobian matrix ii pF  must be a 











































    (3.27)               
The corresponding Jacobian matrix has 1  on the main diagonal and other elements 
are determined by i . The value of the Jacobian matrix is relevant to iii cba ,,, , and ijg . 
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The value of the sigmoid function is relevant to the parameters ii cba ,,  , which is not 
too large and the value of i  is also not too large. The link gain ijg is very small in 
practice, which depends on the distance of CR to base station. Thus, the Jacobian matrix 
is a non-singular and this proves the existence of Nash equilibrium. 
 Numerical results and discussion 3.4
To illustrate the advantages of the proposed algorithm, we compare the 
performance of the sigmoid power control algorithm with three different previous 
works, namely CDPC algorithm (Grandhi et al., 1994), Norm-2 algorithm (Koskie & 
Gajic, 2005), and Hyperbolic algorithm (Pasandshanjani et al., 2011), (Pasandshanjani 
& Khalaj, 2012).  
For more clarification, the list of cost functions and power control update formula   
(iterative algorithm) that have been used in the simulation comparison are explained and 
declared in Table 3.2. 
It can be seen from Table 3.2 that the power control formula of CDPC can be 
obtained by assuming that the cost function is 2)( iiii cJ  . Due to unavailability 
of pricing term in the cost function of the CDPC, the power control formula does not 






Table 3.2: Cost functions and power control formulas used in the simulation 
comparison. 
Algorithm  Cost function PC formula 
CDPC (Grandhi et al., 
1994) 













Norm-2 Algorithm ( 
Koskie & Gajic, 2005) 
iiiiii pbcJ 


























(Pasandshanjani et al., 
2011; Pasandshanjani & 
Khalaj, 2012) 


































Note that an admission control is not applied in this work, so there is no call-
dropping algorithm to drop mobiles terminals which cannot achieve the target SIR. 
Moreover, the effect of the selected pricing and sigmoid parameters is not studied 
because the work focuses on the demonstration of the algorithm potential. We also did 
not investigate the effects of changing code length or target SIR. 
Initially, we demonstrate the system environment to which our algorithm and the 
above existing algorithms are applied with. We consider a 2000mm2000  cell with one 
cognitive base station located at the center and 30  CR users located randomly by a 
uniform distribution. A simple sketch of the system model is shown in Figure 3.6, in 
which the primary user may be interfered with CR users.  
In this study, the fast fading, shadowing, and interference from the adjacent cells 
were neglected. The background noise power within the user’s bandwidth is considered 
to be W102 17i for all Ni .....,,3,2,1 .  
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h                                                       (3.28) 
where id  is the distance between the thi user and base station of cognitive radio, is 
the path loss exponent, which is supposed to be 4 , and 1A is a constant. The 
processing gain in this simulation is set to 128.  
 
Figure 3.6: Random distribution of 30 cognitive users and one primary user. 
3.4.1 Effect of channel status ki to the next step of power 
 We set the value of target SIR as 5i , the ratio of weighting factors 500ii cb , 
and arrange the channel status value from 0 to
3101  . The power 1kip  is computed 
using the power control formula in Table 3.2 and the equation (3.20).   






















Figure 3.7 shows the values of next step power 1kip according to
k
i , and it is found 
that the proposed sigmoid power control in the dashed blue line has the lowest power 
compared to other algorithms. The solid green line represents CDPC algorithm which 
has a higher power, while the dash-dot black line represent Norm-2 algorithm, and 
dotted red line represents the hyperbolic algorithm. Note that the lowest value of ki
indicates to a good channel and vice versa. 
 
Figure 3.7: Comparison of power update for a range of channel status. 
3.4.2 Fully-loaded power and SIR 
In this part of simulation, all cognitive users start the simulation with an initial 
power W16)0( 1022.2 ip to avoid divide by zero in power updates formula. We used 
the target value of SIR as 5i . The values of the non-negative weighting factors are
1,101 4  ii cb , the sigmoid parameter 20a , and the maximum constraint power of 
all users mW1max ip .   

























We evaluated all algorithms using MATLAB programming and each algorithm run 
80 iterative steps. The numerical results of power and SIR of the algorithms for all CRs 
are displayed in Figure 3.8.  
In Figure 3.8, each line represents the value of power in (mW) and the value of SIR 
for each CR during 80 steps. Each box of power shows the maximum value of power 
mW1max ip  and maximum number of iterations for the y-axis and x-axes respectively. 
In addition, each box of SIR shows the achieve value of SIR and the number of 
iterations for the y-axis and x-axes respectively. 
It is shown in Figure 3.8, that there are some cognitive users in the CDPC algorithm 
and Norm-2 algorithm who reach the maximum power mW1max ip  due to their bad 
channel condition. Furthermore, the reduction of achieved SIR in all algorithms can be 
seen clearly but the reduction is the highest in CDPC algorithm, followed by Norm-2 
algorithm, and hyperbolic algorithm.   
 It is observed that the proposed sigmoid power control algorithm guarantees that all 
users can achieve their target SIR with the reduction of no more than 20%
 99.4~99.3 maxmin  ii  , while for other algorithms, it is shown that some users may 
obtain SIR reduction of more than 50% (Norm-2 and CDPC algorithms). The SIR of 
farthest user with bad channel condition is 2.123 in CDPC, 2.575 in Norm-2 algorithm, 
and 3.157 in hyperbolic algorithm, whereas in the proposed sigmoid algorithm it is 3.99. 
On the other hand, the maximum power consume by the farthest user in our proposed 
sigmoid algorithm is mW915.0 , while in hyperbolic algorithm is mW972.0 , and the 
maximum power of some users in the other algorithms reach the maximum power of
mW1 .   
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Reducing the power consumption among CRs in the proposed sigmoid power control 
algorithm has the following advantages: 
1. Increasing the life time of the batteries of CRs devices. 
2. Reducing overall interference that can harm primary users in the licensed 
network and guarantee work under the interference temperature limit. 
3. Guarantee the QoS of both primary and cognitive radio systems. 
4. Lower interference of CR network resulted in higher acceptable rate in the 
admission control of primary system.   
Figure 3.8: Performance comparison of proposed sigmoid algorithm and other 
algorithms for 30 CRs. 
The number of CRs that reach maxip is demonstrated in Table 3.2. It is found that 9 
CRs use the maximum power in CDPC, and 6 CRs in Norm-2, while in hyperbolic and 
proposed sigmoid algorithms no users need to use its maximum power to achieve the 
target SIR. In the proposed sigmoid algorithm, the reduction of SIR does not exceed 













































































































25% for all CRs, while there are some users who got reduction of more than 25% in 
other algorithm as shown in the last column of Table 3.3. 
It is also found that 6 cognitive users in CDPC and Norm-2 algorithms have 
reductions more than 25% and 8 cognitive radio users in the hyperbolic algorithm. 
 
Table 3.3: Numerical results obtained from the simulation. 
Algorithm Min SIR Max 
SIR 
No of CRs 
reach maxP  
No of CRs with 
25% reduction in SIR 
CDPC (Grandhi 
et al., 1994) 
2.123 5 9 24 
Norm-2  (Koskie 
& Gajic, 2005) 




3.157 5 0 22 
Proposed Sigmoid 3.996 4.995 0 30 
 
As shown in Figure 3.9, the average power computed by the proposed sigmoid 
algorithm is significantly saved, i.e.,  mW10256 3p , while the results of other 
algorithms are  mW10305 3p in the Hyperbolic power control algorithm, 
 mW10370 3p in Norm-2 power control algorithm, and  mW10417 3p in 
CDPC algorithm.  
On the other hand, in comparison with Norm-2, hyperbolic, CDPC schemes, our 
approach leads to a slower convergence rate. In other words, there will be a trade off 
between power consumption and convergence rate. The point regarding this issue is that 
although it seems that the proposed method imposes higher level of complexity due to 
the sigmoid term, but the function argument is small enough to be well approximated by 
the first terms of the corresponding Taylor series. 
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The reason of improvement in power saving refers to the term  iiiii gcIb 2  that 
was introduced in Norm-2 algorithm and replaced by  iiiii gcIb
1sinh  in the 
hyperbolic algorithm and finally replaced by  agcIb iiiii ,  in our proposed sigmoid 
algorithm. If we compare these terms, it can be observed that 
  0)2()(sinh, 1   iiiiiiiiiiiiiii gcIbgcIbagcIb           (3.29) 
It is also shown that algorithm using this term  iiiii gcIb 2  in their power update 
algorithm is more power saving than CDPC algorithm.   
Moreover, the results of the simulation indicate that the sigmoid function applied to 
the term  iiiii gcIb 2  is more efficient than the hyperbolic function and quadratic 
function applied in the norm-2 algorithm.  
On the other hand, Figure 3.10 shows that there are insignificant differences in the 
reduction of the average SIR between all algorithms. The final average value of SIR in 
the proposed sigmoid algorithm is  374.4 , while other algorithms are found to be 
 387.4 in the hyperbolic power control algorithm,  395.4 in the Norm-2 power 
control algorithm, and  402.4  in CDPC algorithm. It is found that there is no 
significant difference for the value of average SIR because all algorithms should be 
adjusted to achieve the same value and show the effectiveness in saving power. 
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of average power for 30 CRs. 
 
Figure 3.10: Comparison of average SIR for 30 CRs. 





































































3.4.3 Impact of noise 
Simulation results from Figures 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 are computed depending on the 
effect of changing power to the amount of interference with fixed value of noise 
(background noise).  
We tested the algorithm with the condition of ,5a  and 25N CRs, together with 





. As shown in Figure 3.11, the average power increases and 
the SIRs decrease with the increase of noise for all algorithms because power is 
proportional to noise, while SIR is inversely proportional to noise as in equation (3.1). 
The proposed sigmoid algorithm provides significant savings of power in high noise 
environments, while the reduction in SIR is insignificant compared to other algorithms. 
It is shown that the change of average SIR is between 4.6 has been achieved by the 
proposed sigmoid power control algorithm, and the target value 5 that is achieved by 
CDPC algorithm. On the other hand, it is found that average power of the proposed 
sigmoid power control is less than 1W, while average power exceeds 2W in the CDPC 
algorithm. In Norm-2 and hyperbolic power control algorithms, the average SIR in the 
range between 4.6 and 5, and their average power are greater than 1 W and but less than 
2 W.         
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Figure 3.11: Performance comparison of average power and SIR for 25 CRs for a 
range of noise values. 
 Accelerating the sigmoid power control game algorithm using Newton 3.5
iteration 
In the previous sections of this work as mentioned in (Al-Gumaei et al., 2014), the 
problem of power control was proposed based on a sigmoid function. The final results 
obtained from the proposed game depend on a system of nonlinear algebraic sigmoid 





























































was the Jacobi iteration, which is a fixed-point iterative method. The fixed-point 
iterative method has slow convergence speed, and the rate of convergent is linear. There 
are various methods that can be used to accelerate the convergence of power control 
algorithm such as Newton and secant iterations. In this subsection, we present a new 
version of Nash equilibrium sigmoid power control algorithm based on Newton 
iteration method. 
3.5.1 Fixed-point algorithm for power updates 
According to equation (3.18), each CR user can update its power level using only 
the knowledge of its own interference level; therefore, this method can be implemented 
in a distributed manner. We assume that the algorithm is updated every step and 
depends on the measured interference. The fixed point iterations for solving (3.18) can 
be expressed in the form )( )()()1( kki
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)()(  is the channel status of the thi user that depends on the measured 
interference at the thk  step of the algorithm. The interference experience by the thi












We may rewrite the algorithm of equation (3.20) in terms of the previous power 
value )(kip and the SIR measurement 
)(k
i by substituting 
)(k















































                                (3.31) 
Both formulation of power control algorithm expressed in (3.30) and (3.31) require 
only a single measurement at each step. Therefore, if this measurement is available to 
the CR, either algorithm can be used to implement a distributed power control. The 
formulation of power control algorithm in terms of power (3.31) requires nonzero initial 
powers. On the other hand, the formulation of power control algorithm in terms of 
interference does not require an initial power because the interference, which includes 
the noise power, is never zero.  
3.5.2 Accelerated algorithm using Newton iterations 
In this subsection, we replace the fixed point iteration that was proposed in previous 
work using Newton iteration to accelerate the convergence of the sigmoid power control 























   



















































































           (3.33) 
By selecting an appropriate value of , the acceleration of the power control 
algorithm will be improved. When 0 , the power update formula will return to the 
previous fixed point form as in equation (3.30). 
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3.5.3 Numerical results  
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed algorithm based on Newton 
iterations, we tested it in realistic simulation using MATLAB. We compared the 
developed algorithm with the previous work that used fixed point iteration.  
We considered a 2kmkm2   square cognitive radio cell with cognitive base station 
located at the center of the cell. There are N CRs user located randomly given by a 
uniform distribution, and one primary user located inside the coverage area of the cell 
and may be interfered with CR users. A simple sketch of the system model is shown in 
Figure 3.12 in which 25 CRs users are distributed inside the cell.  
The maximum power of each CR is limited to W101 3max ip , and the background 
receiver noise power W102.0 17i . The target SIR of all CRs 5i , the sigmoid 
parameter 20a , and the pricing factors 1,10000  cb .   






h                                                   (3.34) 
where ir  is the distance between the thi user and base station, is the path loss 
exponent, which is supposed to be 4 , and 1A  is a constant. The processing gain is 
set to 128. Similar to the previous simulation, the fast and shadow fading, and 
interference from adjacent cells have been neglected. Both algorithms run until the 
difference between current value of power and the previous value is less than tolerance
101  e , and the small perturbation fraction is 5105  .  
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Figure 3.12: A typical random distribution of 25 CRs 
We ran simulation of algorithms using the fixed point iteration in equation (3.31), 
and the accelerated of Newton iteration in equation (3.33) with 10 CRs. Figure 3.13 and 
Figure 3.14 show the power and SIR convergence for all CRs, and each curve represents 
the value of one CR for each step.  
It is observed that the developed sigmoid power control algorithm based on Newton 
iteration method converge faster (6 iterations only) compare with fixed point iteration 
(11 iterations). In this test, all CRs can achieve that target SIR because the amount of 
interference is low and the budget of power is enough. In fact, the achieve value of SIR 
will change by increasing number of SIR due to the increase of interference. Farthest 
CRs with bad channel conditions will achieve SIR lower than the target. 





























Figure 3.13: Powers iteration comparison for 10 CRs 
 
Figure 3.14: SIRs iteration comparison for 10 CRs  
In the second simulation, we increased the cell loading to 25 CRs, and we presented 
the average values of power and SIR. We found that a greater improvement in the 
convergence speed of the developed (Newton method) sigmoid power control algorithm 
comparing is achieved compared to fixed point algorithm as shown in Figure 3.15 and 
Figure 3.16. It is shown that the developed algorithm can converge to the Nash solution 







































































using only 44 steps of iteration as compared to the fixed point algorithm that needs 107 
iterations to reach the Nash equilibrium.     
 
Figure 3.15: Average mobile power in the 25 CRs 
 
Figure 3.16: Average SIR in the 25 CRs 
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In Figure 3.17, we ran the simulation in different system loads (increase number of 
users) and obtained the number of iterations required to converge to Nah equilibrium. 
The results indicate that the Newton iterative method reduces the required number of 
iterations in power control algorithm. The percentage of reduction ranges from 4.28% in 
the system of 5 CR users and increase to 58% in the system of 25 CR users.   
This shows that Newton method for power control algorithm is best suited for high 
loaded systems.  
 
Figure 3.17: Number of iteration comparison with different number of CRs  
 
 Conclusion 3.6
Having studied several power control algorithms based on different cost functions, 
a new cost function for SIR-based sigmoid power control algorithm in cognitive radio 
networks has been proposed. The proposed power control algorithm achieves a 



























Number of CRs 
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significant reduction in power at approximately the same level of average SIR. This will 
enable the proposed algorithm to serve more CRs and thus achieve the optimal 
exploitation of the spectrum with the least amount of interference.  
In addition, the proposed algorithm results in better fairness, in which all users meet 
their SIR constraints without transmitting at high power levels. The proposed sigmoid 
power control algorithm is general and can be applied to the uplink of low-range two 
tier femtocell networks using the game approach. However, an efficient pricing 
technique would be required to manage the cross-tier interference. 
The iteration method used in the proposed sigmoid power control algorithm was the 
fixed point iterative method which has slow convergence. We developed the sigmoid 
power control algorithm based on Newton iterative method to accelerate the 
convergence. Simulation results indicate that the Newton iterations can reduce the 
required iterations for the algorithm convergence by selecting an appropriate value of 
the perturbation fraction. Improvement in the convergence speed occurs in a variety of 









CHAPTER 4: A NOVEL UTILITY FUNCTION FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT 




The challenge in game theory approach is the formulation of a utility function that 
it has a physical meaning and the game outcome is not trivial (Hossain et al., 2009). 
There are various and different ways to design a power control algorithm based on 
utility and price functions.  
Some researchers proposed utility as a difference between utility and pricing 
functions, and users seek to maximize this utility in a selfish manner. In this case, the 
utility function should be quasi-concave and an optimal point is selected to be 
somewhere within the practical parameter range, such as minimum and maximum 
power, and it depends on other users’ behavior (Hossain et al., 2009). The special case 
of this type of utility function is energy efficiency, in which the utility has a physical 
meaning of the number of successfully received information bits per joule of energy 
cost. All users adjust their transmit power to achieve the required SIR that is not defined 
directly inside the utility function, but depends on the supposed efficiency function.  
On the other hand, some other researchers proposed the utility (cost) function as a 
difference between price and utility functions, and users seek to minimize this cost 
function in a selfish manner. In this case, the cost function should be quasi-convex and 
the optimal point (minimum point) is selected to be somewhere within the practical 
parameter. In the cost function approach, all users try to achieve the required SIR (target 
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SIR ii  ) that is usually defined in the cost function. The differences between the 
two approaches have been summarized in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Differences between utility and cost function based power control. 
 Power control based on Utility 
function 
Power control based on Cost 
function 
Definition Difference between utility and 
price (Utility -Price) 
Difference between price and 
utility (Price-Utility) 
Users goal Maximize their own utility Minimize their own cost 
Function shape Quasi-concave (maxima) Quasi-convex (minima) 
Final SIR The SIR achieved depends on 
efficiency function that is defined 
in utility function 
The SIR achieved is equal to 
the target that is declared in 
cost function 
Others Similarly to optimization theory Similarly to control theory 
 
In this chapter, we proposed a novel utility function function in underlay scenario 
for cognitive radios that consists of a weighted exponential of the ratio of target SIR and 
the desired signal, and the pricing function that comprises a power function of CR’s 
transmitting power.  
The important features of the proposed power control energy efficient scheme are: 
(i) it can preserve the required QoS of all CRs efficiently with insignificant reduction in 
SIR, (ii) the algorithm can be practically implemented in a distributive manner without 
requiring additional information, (iii) a significant reduction, and better power 
allocation to all CRs, and (iv) fast convergence to Nash equilibrium.  
The novelty of the proposed power control scheme is the new sigmoid exponential 
efficiency function and the power function that applied to the pricing part. The choice of 
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the proposed utility and pricing functions is the key to enable each CR to choose its 
transmitting power efficiently. It guides closest CRs to the base station to achieve their 
QoS requirement with low cost, whereas it guides farthest CRs from the base station to 
achieve their QoS requirement with high cost to mitigate the interference.   
We proved the Nash equilibrium existence of the power control game and the 
conditions of the selected pricing factors. Furthermore, we explained the difference 
between the linear and power functions to the pricing function, and the effect of 
weighting factor to the utility function and transmit power. On the other hand, we 
explained that the proposed efficient non-cooperative power control algorithm (EF-
NPGP) can be practically implemented in a distributive manner without requiring 
additional information. 
The rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the system model of CR, 
the non-cooperative power control game based on the utility function, and presents the 
EF-NPGP algorithm. Section 4.3 presents the numerical results and discussion. The 
conclusion is presented in section 4.4. 
 Syetem model 4.2
In this chapter, we consider a single cell CRN with one cognitive base station 
(CBS) and one primary access point (PAP) as shown in Figure 4.1. This work focuses 
on uplink power control case, and can also be applied in downlink. The cognitive radio 
cell contains N CRs which share unused parts of licensed spectrum with a single 
primary user, and they employ code division multiple access (CDMA) technique to 
utilize the available spectrum in their own communications. It is assumed that CRs are 
stationary in which all the path gains of all CRs are fixed and all CRs are distributed 
inside the coverage area of the cell.  
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The transmit power of thi cognitive user is denoted by ip  and the channel link gain 
(path gain) between the thi  cognitive user and CBS is ih  which depend on the distance 
between thi  cognitive user and CBS.  
In general, the formula of SIR in the single cell cognitive radio CDMA system of 
















                      (4.1) 
where G denotes the processing gain of the spread spectrum system, i  is the 
threshold SIR, and 
2 is the power of the Gaussian noise.  
The denominator of equation (4.1) represents the sum of interference including noise 
and can be denoted as  iiI p , hence equation (4.1) can be rewritten as a function of 























p                               (4.2) 
The subscript i  in the power vector ip  of equation (4.2) indicates to the vector of 
all users’ power except the thi user.  
In this system model, we assume that the primary system seeks to maximize its own 
revenue (profit) by allowing many CRs to share its own licensed spectrum. The revenue 
maximizing is restricted by the limited performance degradation of primary users or 
interference temperature limit (Hossain et al., 2009).    
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Figure 4.1: System model of cognitive radio network 
The total interference power made by CRs should be less than a given threshold 
that is called interference temperature limit which guarantees the QoS of primary users, 




Ihp  1 ,0                                              (4.3) 
where 
ih ,0  is the path gain from the transmitter of cognitive radio i to the access point 
of the primary system, and TLI is the interference temperature limit. 
4.2.1 Non-cooperative power control game with pricing 
In recent years, concepts of microeconomics and game theory have been used 
extensively to define users QoS in terms of utility (cost) function instead of SIR 
(Hossain et al., 2009). In general, the power control game model consists of three 
elements (i) mobile users (or CRs) that represent the players or decision makers of the 
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game, (ii) power strategy which represents the game strategy or action space, and (iii) 
utility function (preference of users).   
Each cognitive user in the network tries to maximize its own utility without any 
cooperation with other users. The non-cooperative power control game (NPG) model 
can be expressed as 
     (.)}]{},{,[ ii uPN                                         (4.4) 
Where }...,,2,1{ Nn  is the index set of players (CRs), ],0[ maxii PP   represents the 
transmission power strategy set of user i , and max
iP is the maximum transmission power 
of user i . The utility function of user i  is referred to as (.)iu , in which each CR seeks to 
maximize its own utility function in a selfish manner.  
The main objectives of power control game is to reduce the power consume of CRs, 
achieve the required SIR, and mitigate the total interference in CRN. To achieve these 
objectives, the payoff function (utility function) of power control game in equation (4.4) 
should consider the following properties as in (MacKenzie & DaSilva, 2006):  
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1. The utility is a function of CRs transmits power and SIR. The SIR of CR is a 
function of CR’s transmit power and the transmit power of other users. 
2. When CR user increases its power level, this will increase its own SIR, but will 
decrease the SIR of other CRs. 
3. For a fixed SIR, the CR prefers lower power level to higher ones to extend 
battery life and reduce interference. 
4. For a fixed power, the CR prefers higher SIR to lower SIR in order to obtain a 
good channel condition. 
In wireless and cognitive radio network, each CR transmits its information over the 
air using multiple access system. Since air is a common medium for all the signals, each 
CR’s signal acts as interference to other user’s signal. This interference plus fading, 
multipath and background noise cause signal distortion as its traveling from the source 
to destination. The denominator of the SIR in equation (4.1) represents all these 
impediments of the signal.  
Moreover, CR terminals are battery-based devices, so the transmitter power is 
another important commodity for them. Therefore, SIR and transmit power are the most 
important parameters that will be used to formulate the expression, which determines 
user satisfaction using the network (Shah et al., 1998).  
Information sent from transmitters to receivers in wireless data and CRNs are in the 
form of frames (or packets) of length M bits, containing ML information bits at a 
data rate of R bits/sec.  Assuming that all errors in the received signal can be detected 
by the system and the incorrect data can be retransmitted, then, the achieved throughput 
T can be defined as 
)(fRT                                                    (4.5) 
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where )(f  is the efficiency function of transmission. The efficiency function )(f  
should depend on SIR achieved over the channel, and the value of )(f should varies 
from zero to one (i.e., ]1,0[)( f ).  
Furthermore, if the user’s i  transmitted power is ip , then the utility function of user 
i can be expressed as the number of information bits received successfully per Joule of 
energy consumed as (Goodman & Mandayam, 2000) 










p                                           (4.6) 
The Nash equilibrium resulting from non-cooperative power control is inefficient 
because it ignores the cost (harm) it imposes on other terminals by the interference they 
generate. Therefore, the concept of pricing has been used to encourage cognitive users 
to use the network resource more efficiently. The general expression of non-cooperative 
power control game with pricing (NPGP) can be written as 
     (.)}]{},{,[ Cii
C uPN                                         (4.7) 
where ],....,,2,1[ Nn  is the index of participating CRs, who are the decision makers 
of the game  select a particular transmit power level; iP  denote the set of transmission 
power strategies of the thi CR, and (.)Ciu is the utility function via pricing that can be 
defined as 
        ),(),(),( i-i-i- ppp iiiii
C
i pvpupu                                  (4.8) 
Several works considered the problem of power control by introducing dissimilar 
utility and pricing functions. In (Saraydar et al., 2002), the authors proposed the energy 














p                     (4.9) 
where 
1C is the positive pricing factor. Based on equation (4.9), authors in (Zhang et 
al., 2012) used the same utility function in (Saraydar et al., 2002),  and they introduced 
a new pricing function. The non-cooperative power control game (NPG) was 
established using the modified Shuffled Frog Leaping Algorithm (MSFLA) by Zhang et 
al. (2012) and the utility function expressed as follows  








pu ii    32
2/
i- 1),(:MSFLANPG p        (4.10) 
where 2C  and 3C  are the positive pricing factors. The efficiency function that has 
been used in (Saraydar et al., 2002) and (Zhang et al., 2012), is the same, which is 
related to the non-coherent frequency shift keying (FSK) modulation scheme. The 
formula of efficiency function is expressed as 
 Mi ief 2/1 1)(                                                (4.11) 
In (Kuo et al., 2013), the authors proposed a utility function depending on the 
sigmoid function, and they introduced a new design of pricing function. The non-
cooperative power game with pricing (NPGP) was established using the efficient swarm 
































p                  (4.12) 
where 1C and 2C are the positive pricing factors,
thp is the average interference power 
which can be obtained by taking the mean value of users transmit power 
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)(2                                              (4.13) 
The fair power control game in (Xie et al., 2014) proposed the utility function based 
on the simplified sigmoid function that was used in (Kuo et al., 2013), and they 
introduced a new non-linear pricing function where the non-cooperative power game 























p                     (4.14) 
where 1C s a positive pricing factor and i is another pricing factor that varies for 
different CRs based on their generated conditions, and the formula of the efficiency 
function is expressed as 
     
iie




)(3                                             (4.15) 
4.2.2 Proposed game model 
Based on the previous works, we propose in this section a novel utility function 
based on a new sigmoid efficiency function and a power function of user’s transmit 
power pricing function.   
Example: SIR-based packet delivery ratio  
Given the packet size and data-rate to any source destination wireless system such as 
(802.11g OFDM implementation), the packet delivery ratio (PDR) as a function of SIR 
is dependent on the transceiver radio card (Smith et al., 2014).  
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The simulation results of PDR obtained from Trivellato simulator (Trivellato, 2007) , 
(Baldo et al.,, 2007) indicates that the function of PDR is a sigmoid function of SIR. In 
addition, another study (Kovács et al., 2011) gave an excellent approximation of 
practical sigmoidal functions of SIR using Gompertz function (Gompertz, 1825). By 
converting the SIR back to the linear domain, the formula of packet delivery ratio 
(PDR) can be expressed as a compressed exponential function of inverse SIR /1 where 
the compressed exponential function is equivalent to the complementary cumulative 






















exp                                         (4.16) 
where ca and cb are constant parameters with respect to particular packet sizes and 
data rates. The sample of results obtained from Trivellato simulator for different values 
of data rate and packet size are summarized in Table 4.2.  
  In Table 4.2, there are three example of implementation with respect to data rates (6 
Mbps, 9 Mbps, and 18Mbps) and packet sizes (256 bytes, 512 bytes, and 128 bytes).   
The table shows the values of the parameters ca  and cb  in the third and fourth columns 





Table 4.2: Data rates, packet sizes results from (Trivellato, 2007), with estimated 
parameters ca and cb in compressed exponential function (4.16) 
Data rate Packet Size 
ca  cb  
6 Mbps 256 bytes 1.194 4.733 
9 Mbps 512 bytes 0.4875 2.911 
18 Mbps 128 bytes 0.2913 2.998 
Figure 4.2, depicts the comparison of the three samples packet delivery ratio 
estimated from (4.16) according to the range of SIR value. It is found that packet 
delivery ratio depends on the achieved value of SIR and the value of PDR varies from 
zero to one (i.e., ]1,0[PDR ).  
 
Figure 4.2: SIR vs PDR simulation (Trivellato, 2007) , (Baldo et al., 2007) and 
compressed-exponential approximation (4.16), for the three data rates and packet sizes 
in Table 4.2. 


























6 Mbps, 256 bytes
9 Mbps, 512 bytes 
18 Mbps, 128 bytes
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  Therefore, we introduce our proposed sigmoid efficiency function as the 
exponential ratio of target SIR and the desired signal similar to the packet delivery 
ration formula. The efficiency function is expressed as 























 exp)(4                                            (4.17) 
where a and b  are non-negative weighting factors. The features of this proposed 
efficiency function can be summarized as: 
(1) The efficiency function introduced in equation (4.17) is a sigmoidal shape 
function with 1)( f , and 0)0( f  that ensure 0iu  when 0ip .  
(2)  The efficiency function )(4 if  with data rate R represents the throughput of 
the system (number of information bits that can be transmitted successfully).  
The comparison of the proposed efficiency function and the efficiency functions 
declared in equations (4.11), (4.13), and (4.15) is shown in Figure 4.3. It can be seen 
that all efficiency functions increased by increasing the value of SIR.  
107 
 
Figure 4.3: Efficiency function comparison .80M 3,b0.8,a10,
i
Γ   
The proposed energy efficient utility function should be satisfy some of the 
properties as in (Shah et al., 1998), (Famolari et al., 2002) 
Property 4.1: The utility function iu is a monotonically increasing function of the 
cognitive users SIR i  for a fixed transmitter power ip . Thus, the differentiate of utility 
function with respect to SIR is positive  












                                        (4.18) 
Property 4.2: The utility function obeys the law of diminishing marginal utility for 
large values of SIR i .  
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We further assume the utility function to be a positive function of SIR, and when
0i , we assume that the utility function iu is zero. On the other hand, the transmit 
power attribute to conserve battery energy. At the same time, we should avoid the case 
such as zero transmits power. These can be specified in the form of the following three 
properties. 
 Property 4.3: The utility is a monotonically decreasing function of the user's 
transmitter power (for a fixed SIR).  












                          (4.20) 
Property 4.4: In the limit that the transmit power tends to zero the utility value also 









                                                (4.21) 
Property 4.5: In the limit that the transmitter power goes to infinity the utility value 







                                                 (4.22) 
According to the energy efficiency equation (4.17) and the above five properties, the 
utility function of the thi CR can be also written as a ratio between CR user’s throughput 
and transmit power as   





























                                   (4.23) 
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The utility function in equation (4.23) represents the tradeoff between the throughput 
and battery life and it is particularly appropriate for applications where saving power is 
more important than achieving a high throughput, such as green cognitive radio 
(Meshkati et al., 2006).  
Assuming that the value of target SIR is fixed at the cognitive radio system and the 
weighting factor does not depend on the data rates or packet sizes, the proposed utility 
function can be tuned using the weighting factor a . The user’s optimal transmit power 
will be changed depending on the maxima of utility function.  
Figure 4.3 shows the curves of our proposed utility function with respect to transmit 
power in with different values of weighting factor a . It is shown that the utility 
increases and the transmitting power decreases by decreasing the value of the parameter
a , but this will decrease the target of SIR of the system. The weighting factor a can be 
broadcasted by the primary system to the cognitive radios to adjust the target value of 
SIR depending on the QoS of primary users and the amount of interference. The 
primary system sends a lower value of parameter a  when the amount of interference 
approximately reaches the interference temperature limit. 
The resulting of the non-cooperative power control game has Nash equilibrium, but it 




Figure 4.4: User’s utility function as a function of transmits power for fixed 
interference and different value of weighting factor a. 
 
Furthermore, we introduced a new design of the pricing function to improve the 
system performance in order to encourage CRs to use system resources efficiently. The 
contribution of our design is to apply a high cost to the users that use high power, such 
as the farthest users from the base station, and decrease the cost of the closest users. 
Therefore, we introduced a power function of the transmit power instead of 
traditional linear pricing. Figure 4.5 shows an example to explain the difference 
between linear and power pricing techniques. We assumed that user transmit power 
varies between the minimum and maximum power strategy space ]2,0[ , and price 
functions are computed numerically.  


























It is shown that the power function pricing is lower than the linear function pricing 
for CRs who use low transmit power (closer users), whereas a high pricing cost will be 
applied to the CRs who use high transmit power (farthest users).      
 
 Figure 4.5: Linear and power function pricing comparison with 5c and 5.2  
Thus, the proposed pricing function is expressed as 

iii pcpv ),( i-p                                           (4.24) 
where c and  are the  pricing factors. Thus, the utility function with pricing can be 
expressed as a difference between utility and price as 





























 exp),( i-p                   (4.25) 
Therefore, the proposed energy efficient non-cooperative power control game with 
pricing (EF-NPGP) is expressed as 




























































exp),(max:NPGPEF i-p     (4.26) 
The advantage of power pricing function is its ability to encourages CRs to use lower 
transmit power and thus can lead to Pareto improvement over the non-cooperative 
game. This is done by increasing the cost of the farthest users who use high transmit 
power in their communication. Moreover, the pricing function reduced the cost applied 
to the nearest CRs who use low transmit power in their communication. If the difference 
of objective function (utility-price) is quasi-concave, then we argue and show that there 
exists Nash equilibrium. In Figure 4.6, we show the effect of the power pricing function 
to the energy efficient non-cooperative power control game. The user uses lower power 
P1 in the case of utility-pricing compared to P2 in the case of utility only (without 
pricing).    
Each CR seeks to maximize its own profit (utility-price) by adjusting its transmit 
power in a distributed manner. The expected Nash equilibrium resulting from the power 
control game is the balanced power of all CRs in that no single CR can increase the 
benefit by changing its own transmits power.  
113 
 
Figure 4.6: Effect of the power pricing function on the energy efficient non-
cooperative power control game 
To derive an algorithm of non-cooperative power control game, we adopt a power 
control algorithm in which each CR will maximize its net utility ),( i-pi
C
i pu . For power 
optimization, the maximization can be achieved at a point for which the partial 
derivative of ),( i-pi
C
i pu with respect to power ip is equal to zero. Following simple 
































                    (4.27) 
4.2.3 Existence of Nash equilibrium 
In non-cooperative power control game, the thi  CR maximizes its utility by choosing 
a proper strategy from the strategy set ],0[ maxii PP  .   

























A Nash equilibrium exists in non-cooperative power control game, if for all 
ni ,..,2,1  meet the following two conditions (Topkis, 1998): 
1. The action set iP is non-empty, convex, and compact subset of some Euclidean
N . 
2. The utility function ),( i-pi
C
i pu is continuous inp and
  Nijppu jiCi  02 . 
The transmit power space strategy for each CR in our game is defined by the 
minimum and maximum powers, and the value of powers is between these values. 
Therefore, the first condition of action set ip is satisfied. 
To show that the CR utility function is quasi-concave in ip , the second derivative of 
),( i-pi
C
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    (4.29) 
Because the first-order derivative of SIR i with respect to the power ip is









jjijiji phphGhp  , therefore we need a second-order 
derivative of our efficiency function with respect to i be 0)(
2
4
2  iif  . 
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                          (4.32) 
According to equation (4.32) and by selecting the pricing factors carefully, the 
second condition has been satisfied. Hence, the proposed power control game has a 
unique Nash equilibrium solution. 
4.2.4 EF-NPGP algorithm 
This subsection presents an iteration algorithm for EF-NPGP scheme to control all 
transmission powers to guarantees the required SIR among all CRs and ensure Nash 
equilibrium opportunisticly with the available SIR information. 
We suppose that each CR updates it’s transmit power at time instances
},....,,{ 21 iii ttt  , where )1(  kiik tt , and we assume the strategy set of power of the thi
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CR is ],[ maxmin iii PPP  . We set an infinitely small quantity where ( >0), and by 
considering the proposed EF-NPGP as given in equation (4.20), generate a sequence of 
powers as follows. 
 
EF-NPGP power control algorithm 




1 Nppppp   randomly at time 0t   
II. For all Ni , at time instant kt  
a) Update )( ki t using equation (4.1) 










c) Assign the transmit power as )),(min()( maxikiki ptrtp    
III. If   )()( 1kk tptp , stop iteration and declare Nash equilibrium as )( ktp . Else, 
1 kk  and go to Step II. 
 
where )( ki tr represents the set of best transmit powers for thi CR at time instant k  in 
response to the interference vector )(p 1 ki t . It is important to note that the thi CR 
optimizes the net utility over the power strategy space of the EF-NPGP. The proposed 
EF-NPGP determine the transmit power of thi CR by selecting smallest power among all 
possibilities as dictated by the algorithm. The algorithm will solve the maximum of each 
cognitive radio’s objective separately.  
















Figure 4.7: Flowchart illustrating the EF-NPGP algorithm 
 Numerical results and discussion 4.3
In this section, we demonstrate and verify the performance of our proposed power 
control game algorithm (EF-NPGP) by comparing the Nash equilibrium results with 
NPG_MSFLIA (Zhang et al., 2012), NPG-ESIA (Kuo et al., 2013), and R-NPGP (Xie 
Yes 
No 
Set t =1, initialize the transmission power 
array   at time t=0 
For i =1 to N at time instant   
Compute    
Given , Compute   





et al., 2014). The utility functions of the previous works that have been used in the 
comparison of simulation are explained in the previous equations (4.10), (4.12), and 
(4.14). We applied the same numerical computation to obtain the Nash equilibrium 
solution of utility functions in order to present the advantages of our proposed utility 
function. The lists of other system parameters we examined and used in the simulation 
are listed in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: System parameters 
Parameter Value 
Total number of bits per frame, M  80 
Number of information bits of each frame, L  64 
Spread spectrum processing gain, G  100 
Data rate, R  10 kbps
 
AWGN power at receiver, 2  5e-15 Watts 




Target SIR, i  10 
Weighting factors ,,, cba and   0.88, 3, 1e4, 2.5 
 
 A simple system model has been considered based on a single-cell cognitive radio 
CDMA system with a fixed packet size and no coding for forward error correction. 
According to the general efficiency function that is defined in equation (4.11), the 
equilibrium SIR obtained by solving the formula 0)()(   ff  that guarantee 
maximum utility is 4.12 . The value of   is the real target SIR that all CRs achieve 
to maximize their own utility function. For the cognitive radio CDMA system, the 
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feasibility condition for the target  is giving by the following bound on the number of 
users (Yates, 1995): 
05.9)(1  GN CR terminal                          (4.33) 
According to (4.33), we assumed that there are not more than 9 CRs in the cognitive 
radio system, and they are distributed around CBS that is located in the center of the 
cell. The distances between 9 cognitive radios users and base station (CBS) are defined 
in the following array ]m1140m,1070m,950m,810m,720m,630 m,580m,490m,368[d  
In this work, for simplicity we use a simple propagation model in which all the path 
gains are deterministic functions, with path loss exponent , of the distance between 
the cognitive radio i  and CBS 






h                                                 (4.34) 
where id is the distance between the thi cognitive radio user and the base station, is 
the path loss exponent, which is supposed to be 4  that is usually between 2 and 6, and 
097.0A  is a constant. The value of 097.0A  is selected to establish a transmit power 
of 2 W for a CR terminal operating at 1140 meters from CBS in the system with 9 CRs, 
and all operating with  .  In this simulation, all cognitive users start their iteration 
with initial power W
16)0( 1022.2 ip for all algorithms, and the algorithm will stop 
when the difference between the current and the previous power is less than 510 .   
We noted that the weighting and pricing factors have been tuned and the simulation 
run until all algorithms achieve the same average value of SIR.  
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Figure (4.8) depicts the results of SIR at Nash equilibrium that are achieved by CR 
according to the distance between each CR and base station. All CR users maintain their 
SIR above the target value ( 10i ) and the value of user’s SIR is decreased by 
increasing the distance for all algorithms. In addition, all algorithms applied different 
pricing (penalty) function to cognitive radios, so different reduction occur on the value 
of SIR.    
The comparison curves of SIR for all algorithms shows that our proposed algorithm 
EF-NPGP is more efficient, especially for the first 7 users, where the values of SIR are 
the highest compared with other algorithms. The performance gap between EF-NPGP 
algorithm and other algorithms indicates that the link quality of CRs of our proposed 
algorithm is better than others. Moreover, the farthest CRs consume the highest power 
in the system to maintain their SIR and they represent the main source of interference. 
Therefore, a higher cost has been applied to those farthest users in the proposed EF-
NPGP algorithm. It is shown that the last two users in our proposed algorithm have 
lowest SIR but still greater than the target SIR and this action will lead to lower 
interference and lower power consumed.  
In order to prove the efficiency of EF-NPGP algorithm, the transmit power of each 
user against the distance of each CR user are illustrated Figure 4.9. The different curves 
in Figure 4.9 represent the transmit power in Watts with the distance between each CR 
and the base station (CBS) for all algorithms. It can be seen that the transmit power 
increases gradually by increasing the distance of the user from the base station. It can 
also be seen that the transmit power curve of the proposed EF-NPGP is the lowest 




Figure 4.8: Comparison curves of each CR’s SIR for all algorithms 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Comparison curves of each CR’s transmit power for all algorithms 
 













































Table 4.4 illustrates the SIR values of CR users at the end of simulation for all 
algorithms. This table shows that the EF-NPGP with our proposed price function 
achieve the highest value of SIR compared to other algorithms. The SIR of the last two 
CR users is smaller due to applied higher cost. Therefore, it can reach a better 
equilibrium point by restricting the minimum required SIR for the CR terminals with 
bad channel conditions. 
Table 4.4: Simulation results comparison of final SIR 
 
In the second test, we compute the average power and average SIR for all algorithms 
to determine the convergence speed of all algorithms, and the reduction of average 
power. In this test, the horizontal axis represents the number of iterations that needs to 
obtain the Nash equilibrium and the vertical axis represents the average SIR and 
average power.  
As shown in Figure 4.10, all algorithms approximately achieve the same value of 
average SIR without any significant differences, but the convergence speeds are not 
equal. Through the results, we found that our proposed EF-NPGP algorithm is faster 
than other algorithms (250%-300%). It can reach the Nash equilibrium with only 133 
CR user # Final SIR of NPG 
MSFLIA (Zhang et 
al., 2012) 
Final SIR of NPG-
ESIA (Kuo et al., 
2013) 
Final SIR of R-
NPGP (Xie et 
al., 2014) 
Final SIR of 
Proposed EF-
NPGP 
1 12.41 12.42 12.42 12.69 
2 12.40 12.43 12.43 12.69 
3 12.40 12.43 12.43 12.69 
4 12.39 12.43 12.43 12.69 
5 12.37 12.42 12.42 12.68 
6 12.33 12.40 12.40           12.66 
7 12.26 12.30 12.30       12.40 
8 12.18 12.10 12.10 11.53 
9 12.11 11.92 11.91 10.61 
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iterations while it needs 333, 360, and 323 for NPG-MSFLA, NPGP-ESIA and R-
NPGP, respectively.  
However, in Table 4.6, it is quite obvious that EF-NPGP saves much simulation 
iterations than other three algorithms, which means that our proposed scheme reduces 
the computational complexity. This is because other NPG-MSFLA and NPGP-ESIA 
algorithms used artificial algorithms to search for the optimal power control strategies 
without considering the algorithm complexity. In addition, our proposed scheme 
reduces the computational complexity more than R-NPGP. 
On the other hand, the comparison curves of the average transmit powers resulted 
from all algorithms is shown in Figure 4.11. It is easy to see in Figure 4.11 that the 
average power consumption of the proposed EF-NPGP algorithm has a significant 
reduction compared to other algorithms. Results shown in Figure 4.11 indicate that the 
amount of interference measured at the primary system or at interference temperature 
point from the proposed EF-NPGP is the lowest compared to other algorithms. This 
feature make the proposed EF-NPGP algorithm is the best for maximizing the spectrum 
sharing and QoS guarantees in both primary and cognitive radio systems. The 
convergence speed of all algorithms can be seen clearly in Figure 4.11, in which it 
founds that our proposed EF-NPGP is the fastest. 
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Figure 4.11: Comparison curves of average power for all algorithms with number of 
iterations 
























































Table 4.5 explained the average power in Watt, and the number of iterations of all 
algorithms.       
Table 4.5: Values of average power and number of iterations of algorithms 
Algorithm Average power (W) Number of iterations 
NPG-MSFLA 0.2321 333 
NPGP-ESIA 0.2319 360 
R—NPGP 0.2287 323 
EF-NPGP 0.1926 133 
 
In the last simulation, we test the impact of noise to the average power and SIR of 
the proposed and other algorithms. We run algorithms simulation using the same 
parameters that were applied to the previous tests. We vary the value of noise from 
17103  W to 1410 W.  
As observed in Figure 4.12,  the average power increases with the increase of noise 
because the power is proportional to noise, while the average SIRs decrease with the 
increase of noise because SIR is inversely proportional to noise as in equation (4.1). It is 
found that the proposed EF-NPGP algorithm provides significant energy savings in case 
of high noise, in which the maximum of average power is ( 2078.0NPGPEFp W), while 
( 3127.0p W) for other algorithms. On the other hand, the average SIR of the 
proposed EF-NPGP algorithm is the highest compared to other algorithms, and there is 
insignificant reduction at high noise.     
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Figure 4.12: Performance comparison of average power and SIR for noise values 
 Conclusion 4.4
In this chapter, a non-cooperative energy efficient power control algorithm in 
cognitive radio networks has been presented. The QoS of a CR user refers to an efficient 
utility function via pricing. By introducing the new utility and price functions, an 
efficient non-cooperative power control game has been produced and the existence, 
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium has been also proved. Numerical results indicate that 
the non-cooperative power control algorithm proposed in this chapter has better power 


































































In addition, most of closer CR users in our proposed algorithm can meet higher SIR 
than the users in other algorithms. The higher pricing is only applied to the farthest 
users that represent a main source of undesirable interference.  The proposed scheme 
offers an improved performance, in which the CRN can now share extra licensed band 
under the interference temperature limits. The significant reduction in the transmit 
power of the proposed power control algorithm gives the highest preference to apply it 












CHAPTER 5: A GAME THEORY APPROACH FOR EFFICIENT POWER 
CONTROL AND INTERFERENCE MANAGEMENT IN TWO-TIER 




Recent studies on wireless usage found that most voice calls and data traffic are 
originated from indoor and the surest method to increase system capacity of a wireless 
link is by getting the transmitter and receiver closer to each other (Chandrasekhar et al., 
2008). 
To meet the increasing demand of video application and the increased in system 
capacity in the wireless indoor transmission and services, femtocell has been considered 
as a promising solution to increase the coverage and capacity of the network. A 
femtocell or a home base station (HBS) is a short-range (i.e. 10-50m), low-power, low-
cost, and consumer owned device that is installed inside the houses and offices for 
better indoor voice and data services. A home base station HBS installed by the 
consumer connects the cellular network to the internet via an IP backhaul, such as 
digital subscriber line (DSL), cable, or WiMAX. 
There are two approaches for spectrum allocation between the macrocell and 
femtocell users: (i) spectrum splitting and (ii) spectrum sharing. In a two-tier femtocell 
network, the spectrum sharing approach is commonly used due to the scarcity of 
available spectrum and the absence of coordination between macrocell and femtocell as 
well as between femtocells (Kang et al., 2012). When spectrum sharing rather than 
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spectrum splitting is adopted, the interference will be more serious (Ahmad et al., 
2014). 
 Since femtocells operate in the licensed spectrum owned by the macrocell network, 
it is essential to decrease the cross-tier interference from FUEs to the macrocell (La 
Roche et al; 2010). Recent research topics focus on the development of interference 
management schemes such that  
(i) guarantee to achieve the quality of service (QoS) of the higher access priority 
macrocell users (MUEs), and  
(ii) efficient utilization of the residual network capacity by the newly-deployed 
FUEs to optimize performance.      
The radio frequency (RF) interference will arise from femtocell to femtocell 
interference, femtocell to macrocell interference, and macrocell to femtocell 
interference. The femtocell to femtocell is quite small due to low transmit power and 
penetration losses. The near-far effect due to uneven distribution of received power is 
the main contributor for femtocell to macrocell interference and macrocell to femtocell 
interference (Chandrasekhar et al., 2008).  
Macrocell networks, such as CDMA networks (without existing femtocells) employ 
an efficient power control to compensate for path loss, shadowing, and fading, to 
provide uniform coverage. When femtocells are added, power control creates dead 
zones as in Figure 5.1. Macrocell users at a cell edge need to use maximum power in the 
uplink transmitting, which causes unacceptable interference to nearby femtocells. 
Therefore, femtocells located at the cell edge experience significantly higher 
interference than interior femtocells. On the other hand, macrocell users at cell edge will 
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be disrupted by femtocell transmissions since they suffer higher path loss than interior 










Figure 5.1: Dead zones in a mixed femtocell/macrocell deployment 
The problem of spectrum sharing and interference management in the two-tier 
femtocell networks has become a technical challenge to scientists and researchers. The 
implementation and development of distributed interference management is the main 
challenge in femtocell networks due to limited capacity of the signaling wire-line 
network (e.g., DSL links) and difference access priority between MUEs and FUEs 
(Claussen, 2007)(Yavuz et al., 2009) (Güvenç et al., 2008) (Jo et al., 2009). The 
existence of indoor femtocells makes power control creating dead zones, leading to non-
uniform coverage.  
Uplink (mobile to base 
station) 
Downlink (base station 
to mobile) 
Macrocell BS transmits to cell 
edge MUE in femtocell dead zone 
Femtocell transmits to 
FUE and create dead zone 
for MUE 
Near by MUE transmits 
with high power to 
macro BS and create 
dead zone for FUE 
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To mitigate cross-tier interference and guarantee QoS for both MUEs and FUEs, an 
efficient distributed power control algorithm for interference management is important 
in two-tier femtocell networks. 
There are some differences between the femtocell networks and traditional wireless 
networks which are the infrastructures of the system, and the different classes of users, 
so different power control algorithm should be designed for macrocell and femtocell 
network.  Femtocells are low-rang (not identical with macrocells), therefore, all FUEs 
have a higher channel gain and require different power control algorithm.  
In this chapter, we present a new power control scheme for the distributed 
interference management in two-tier femtocell networks. The objective of this power 
control scheme is to ensure that users with higher priority access (MUEs) able to 
achieve their required QoS, whereas users with lower priority access demand certain 
QoS requirements.  
The difference between power control algorithm proposed in this work and previous 
works proposed in the traditional CDMA wireless networks or cognitive radio networks 
is the differentiated classes of users, in which each class of users’ needs a different 
power control algorithm based on the access priority.  
It is noteworthy that, our proposed power control differs from previous power control 
scheme proposed by (Ngo et al., 2012) in several aspects. Firstly, in the representation 
of the utility function of MUEs, the study in (Ngo et al., 2012) uses sigmoid function to 
guarantee the minimum required SINRs. Power control algorithm using a sigmoid 
function is more complex because the power update formula of MUE depends on the 
value of optimal target SINR needed to be computed during each iteration. Instead, we 
defined utility function of MUEs as a square function of SINR error, and the deduced 
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power update formula depends on the target SINR. Secondly, we introduced a new local 
gain in our FUEs cost function based on the local information, which can improve the 
performance of FUEs.  
For too heavily loaded system, the proposed algorithm for MUEs and FUEs yield 
unacceptably low SINRs. Mobiles whose SINRs fall below a minimum QoS threshold 
should be dropped, otherwise, they will cause unnecessary interference to other users 
using the same frequency channel. 
The advantages of the proposed power control algorithm are the ability to be 
implemented distributively, mitigate the cross-tier interference, and reduce the drain 
power of users. Hence, the contributions of this work are summarized as follows: 
1. In this chapter, we formulated the game model based on a cost function, in 
which the MUEs guarantee their required QoS, while FUEs request soft QoS 
requirement. 
2. The proposed FUEs cost function contains linear pricing function and local gain 
term in which it has been applied inside the utility part of the cost function. This 
mechanism ensures that, the transmit power of FUEs, which is included inside 
the SINR is gained using local information. 
3. We obtain the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game, present the iterative 
power control formulas, and prove the convergence of the algorithm. 
4. With simulation, we show the effectiveness of the proposed power control 
algorithm in terms of resource allocation and power saving for different cases of 
the system load. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the system model of 
two-tier femtocell network is given, distributed interference-management algorithms are 
proposed and the corresponding analysis is presented in Section 5.3. The performance 
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of the proposed scheme is presented by the numerical results in Section 5.4. Finally, we 
conclude this study in Section 5.5. 
 System model 5.2
In this chapter, we consider a typical two-tier femtocell network where N femtocells 
are overlaid with a macrocell. Specifically, we consider the scenario where N randomly 
distributed femtocells overlaid M macrocell user equipment (MUEs) using code 
division multiple access (CDMA). The MUEs are distributed randomly inside the 
coverage area of macrocell BS with radius cR , the FUEs are randomly distributed inside 
the coverage area of home BS with radius fR , and all femtocells are distributed 
randomly inside the coverage area of macrocell.  
Due to the small radius of femtocells
fR , the effect of interference between the users 
inside a single femtocell is inactive. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume that each 
femtocell only serves one FUE. We further assume that all MUEs and FUEs with their 
base stations are stationary so the path gains are fixed during the run time of power 
control simulation.  
We denote mC and fC as the set of MUEs and FUEs, respectively, and C as the set of 
all users MUEs and FUEs is then
fm CCC  . A simple sketch of the system model of 
a two-tier femtocell network is shown in Figure 5.2, which contains four femtocells 













Figure 5.2: Two tier CDMA femtocell wireless network (Tier 1: macrocell under 
laid tier 2 that includes 3 femtocells) 
We consider the uplink scenario in this work, and any Ci is referred to as the thi
user. Let ip be the transmit power of user i in Watt, iig is the channel gain from user i  to 
its receiver including the processing gain of the system, and
ijg from user j  to the 
receiver of user ji  . We further assume that the channel gains are unchanged during 
the runtime of the power control algorithm. The channel gain is ijij dg 1  with 
neglected shadowing and fast fading effects, where
ijd  
is the distance from user j  to the 
receiver of user i , and is the path loss factor that is usually between 2 and 6. We 
denote the power of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receiver by 2 Watt. 
Here, we use the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) to represent the quality of 
the desired signal compare to the interferer. Then, the SINR obtained by user Ci at its 































2 represents the aggregated interference from all FUEs and 
MUEs except user i .  
In this framework, we assigned different thresholds value of SINR to different 
classes of users, depending on their access priority and application requirements.      
To ensure adequate QoS of the higher access priority MUEs, the power control 
design must ensure that no MUE’s SINR i falls below the target SINR value
m




ii Ci                                         (5.2) 
On the other hand, the design of power control should also ensure that the indoor 
lower access priority FUEs can achieve their required QoS and each
fCi  can attain its 
SINR, that is, more than a predefined threshold
f
i . A higher value of 
f
i  will create 
unnecessary interference to other users. Therefore, we require that each FUE 
fCi   
must have that: 
f
f
ii Ci                                           (5.3) 
In this chapter, we employ users’ objective function as a cost function iJ  to represent 
the preference of users. We defined the cost functions as a difference between the 
pricing function of user and its utility function, in which each user interest to minimize 
its own cost defined as in (Alpcan et al., 2002): 
   ))(()())(,( pupvppJ iiiiiii                                  (5.4) 
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where the power vector is  TMNpppp  ,....,,: 21 . The pricing function )( ii pv  
represents the cost incurred by user Ci , while the utility function ))(( pu ii  represents 
the degree of satisfaction to the service quality. In fact, equation (5.4) is a standard way 
to define the objective function for network entities (MUEs and FUEs). 
The Nash equilibrium is the power vectors p  that no user can improve its cost 
function individually by deviating from ip . Thus, there is 









***      (5.5) 
The Nash equilibrium of (5.5) can be obtained by taking the derivative of



























                                      (5.6) 
Noting that iiiiiii pIgp   , we have  













                                    (5.7) 
where )( iiu   and )( ii pv denotes to the derivatives of )( iiu  and )( ii pv , respectively. 
In this chapter, we also further introduce a user-specific notation i as a ratio of 
interference to the path gain of the user Ci as in (Xiao et al., 2003) to simplify the 
analysis, as shown in the following 










                                                     (5.8) 
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According to this analysis, we will explain the criteria of how to select the suitable 
functions )( ii pv and )( iiu  with appropriate parameters in designing the efficient 
distributed power control algorithm for both MUEs and FUEs. The main goal of our 
algorithm is to strictly guarantee the QoS of MUEs, and we allow slight reduction in the 
QoS of FUEs in order to reduce the power consumed by the users and to mitigate the 
cross-tier interference. 
 Distributed power control algorithm 5.3
5.3.1 Macrocell users cost function 
The applicable method to guarantee the QoS of MUEs is the balancing power control 
method, in which all MUEs achieve the same target SINR. The aim is to guarantee the 
QoS of higher priority MUEs by ensuring that all MUEs can meet the target SINR. On 
the other hand, MUEs do not need to use high power in their transmission to attain high 
SINR (greater than the target) in order to preserve their battery life and minimize the 
cross-tier interference. In this case, all MUEs should have a zero price and the optimal
i should be equal to the target SINR.  
For accurate communication at non-zero levels of SINR, we define the cost function 
of FUE user as the difference between the actual SINR and the target SINR that is 
chosen based on the estimated FER (Koskie & Gajic, 2005). In addition, the cost 
function of MUEs should be convex and positive. We thus consider the following utility 
and pricing functions for MUEs mCi   
                2)( imiiiu                                               (5.9) 
  0)( ii pv                                                    (5.10) 
Thus, according to (5.4), the cost function of the thi MUE can be written as 
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                   mimiiimi CipJ 
2
),(                               (5.11) 
where ),( ii
m
i pJ  is the cost function of MUEs. The optimal i for each user mCi is 
the target SINR, which can be obtained by taking the first derivative of the MUEs cost 
function with respect to i  and equating to zero, 










                                    (5.12) 
Then, 
 m
ii ˆ                                                    (5.13) 
 
Figure 5.3: Cost function of MUEs i with target SINR 5mi . 
It is shown in Figure 5.3 that the optimal (minimum) value of MUE cost function is 
occurres when the user’s SINR is equal to the target value mi . 













 Based on iˆ in (5.13), the optimal power can be obtained from (5.1) as
m
iiiii Igp ˆ   

























ip are the actual SINR and power of user i at iteration k  and 1k , 
respectively. For simplicity, we can use (5.8) to rewrite (5.14). Thus, 






 )()1(                                                   (5.15) 
5.3.2 Femtocell users cost function 
In the case of lower access priority, we assume that for each FUE, fCi is also 
required to maintaining its QoS by achieving the target SINR i . The target i  here is 
different from the threshold value 
f
i  defined in (5.3), which in practice
f
ii  . The 
value of the target SINR should be sufficient to guarantee better service for FUEs and 
should also be not higher because it requires high transmit power to achieve.  
To decrease the cross-tier interference induced to the macrocell, FUEs should 
achieve its target SINR using the minimum required transmit power. In game theory, 
the selection of a cost function is important because it is a basis of the game, which will 
be used to deduce the power iterative algorithm.  
Femtocell user has two conflicting objectives: (i) achieve better service by obtaining 
higher SINR and (ii) higher SINR is achieved at the cost of an increased drain on the 
battery and higher cross-interference to others FUEs and MUEs.  
Therefore, the cost function for each FUE should depend on power and SINR, and it 
should be non-negative and convex to allow the existence of a non-negative minimum. 
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In addition, the target i should be included inside the cost function to be varied 
according to the service requirement. Higher i can be chosen for voice users and lower 
target can be chosen for data users.  
Thus, we consider the cost function of the thi  FUE as in (Koskie & Gajic, 2005) with 
a new special parameter as 
  fiaiiiiiifi CiepbppJ ii 
2
))(,(                      (5.16) 
where ia  and ib  are non-negative weighting factors.  It is shown in (5.16) that the 
cost function ))(,( iii
f
i ppJ  is non-negative because the square of SINR error 
 2iai iie  is always positive due to the square function, and the linear pricing power
ii pb is always positive.  
In addition, the proper selection of the non-negative weighting factors in the cost 
function equation (4.16) is important. Choosing 1)( 2 iiai eb
  places more emphasis on 
power usage, whereas 1)( 2 iiai eb
  places more emphasis on the SINR.     
The new special local gain term iiae  is the advantage of our proposed algorithm, in 
which it can guide FUEs to an efficient Nash equilibrium point when the system 




as a local gain term because it only depends 
on the weighting factor ia and a user-specific notation i  (a ratio of FUEs power and 
SINR).  That means, the local gain term only depends on local information and it does 
not need any other information from home BS.  
The utility part of the cost function (5.16) will guide all FUEs to achieve the target 
SINR, but the Nash equilibrium may actually less than the target SINR due to the 
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pricing term and the new special gain parameter. Nevertheless, slight decrease in FUEs 
SINR will lead to substantial reduction in transmitting power as well as significant 
reduction in the cross-tier interference. Now, applying the necessary condition of Nash 
equilibrium to the thi  FUEs cost function yields: 































eeb iiii )(2                                        (5.18) 














































                                        (5.19) 
It follows from (5.19) that as 0ib , the power expenditure increases and the SINR
iia
ii e
  . On the other hand, as 0ia and 0ib , the SINR will be converging to 
the target ii  . Substituting for i from (5.1) and isolating ip , we can obtain the 





















                                    (5.20) 






























                                 (5.21) 
To present (5.20) as a numerical algorithm, we assume that the algorithm will run in 
real time with potential measurements updated every step of the algorithm (Koskie & 

































                             (5.22) 





















































i p    as in (5.8). The initial condition associated with (5.23) must 
satisfy 0)0( ip . Note that, the positive term in the expression of (5.23) is different from 




has been added 
to the denominator. In addition, the negative term is proportional to the square of 
interference, and the square of exponential of interference.  
The two formulas of algorithm (5.22) and (5.23) require only a single measurement 
at each step of the iteration, so the power control can be used as a distributed power 
control. 
Moreover, we may also rewrite the algorithm of equation (5.22) in terms of previous 
value of power )(kip and the SINR measurement 
)(k
i by substituting 
)(k
iI  in (5.8) using 




i Ipg . 
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Both formulas of power control algorithm (5.23) and (5.24) require local information 
at each step. Therefore, if this information is available to femtocell user, either 
algorithm can be implemented in a distributed manner. Equation (5.24) requires nonzero 
initial power to execute, whereas the formula in terms of interference (5.23) does not 
require an initial power because the interference, which includes the noise power, is 
never zero.      
5.3.3  Convergence 
Having obtained the power control iterative algorithm, we then prove its 
convergence. In (Yates, 1995), authors show that if a fixed point of the algorithm 
)( )()1( kk pfp  exist and the function f satisfy the following three conditions: 
1) Positivity 0)( pf ,  
2) Monotonicity ),()( pfpfpp    
3) Scalability ).()(;1 pfpf       
then the algorithm converges to a fixed and unique point. 
For the MUEs iterative algorithm, the above three properties are obviously satisfied 
as has been explained in (Xu et al., 2014). We still need to prove the convergence of 
FUEs iterative algorithm. 




















                                         (5.25) 
where (.)LambertW  is the LambertW function. When we selected a proper value of
ii ba , the value of )2( iii baLambertW  will be small positive quantity and the 
positivity condition can be easily met. 
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For monotonicity, it is sufficient to have an increasing best response function with 
respect to interference iI . Thus, if we differentiate (5.22) with respect to iI , we get 
    
 
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                          (5.27) 
which is stricter than (5.25). Finally, the condition of the scalability in our method 































































































































































































































          (5.28) 
So, for scalability, it is sufficient that positivity is met. 
From the above certification process of convergence, we found that the set of 
parameters is very important, and we can obtain the same conclusion from the 
simulation.   
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 Simulation results 5.4
In this section, we present the data chart of power, SINR, average power, and 
average SINR of our proposed power control algorithm through our simulation tests.  
We compare the performance with the traditional algorithm without local gain. The 
traditional algorithm has been proposed by  Koskie & Gajic (2005), and it is applied to 





















p                                   (5.29) 
In this simulation, we compare our proposed algorithm with the traditional algorithm 
(Ngo et al., 2012) with respect to femtocell users only, while the power update formula 
of macrocell users is different. To perform a fair comparison with the traditional 
algorithm, we kept the same physical parameters for all network elements, such as 
MUEs, FUEs, and base stations. In all algorithms, the powers update formula of both 
MUEs and FUEs can be achieved in a distributed manner, based on the link local 
information. Each MUE or FUE receiver can measure the total received power, and then 





iiijiji pgpgI . The receiver of user i (MUE or FUE) then sends both values of 
iig and iI  to its transmitter for the update of transmit power in each iteration.  
The local gain proposed in our FUEs cost function has been appearing in both 
positive and negative terms in (5.22).  One of the advantages of our proposed algorithm 
can be found in the positive term of (5.22), in which the algorithm guides FUEs to 
achieve iia
i e
  rather than the target i  that was achieved by the traditional algorithm 
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that appears in the denominator of the negative term of (5.22).  
The network settings and the deployment of users in this simulation are illustrated in 
Figure 5.4, where MUEs are randomly deployed inside the circle of the radii of 
500cR m and served by the macro BS that is located in the center. On the other hand, 
low access priority users FUEs are also randomly deployed inside small circle with radii 
100fR m and all femtocell are inside the area of overlaid macrocell.  In this 
simulation, we assume that each femtocell BS serves only one FUE.  
 
Figure 5.4: Network topology and user placement in the numerical simulation. 
 
The initial power of all users must be a nonzero and it is chosen to be  












Cj  to the receiver of user i  is calculated as

ijd1 where ijd  is the distance between 
transmitter and receiver, and  is the path loss exponent.  
The same pricing coefficients ia  and ib  are used for all FUEs. For the ease of 
reference, we listed and summarized in Table 5.1, the simulation parameters such as the 
number of active MUEs and FUEs, the values of SINR targets m
i , i and the other 
simulation parameters: 
Table 5.1: Simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
Number of users, 
fM NN ,   10,40 
Processing Gain G   100 




i  , ,  5,4 
Noise power 2 in Watt 1010  
fii Ciba ,,  5000, 15000 
 
In this simulation, all MUEs and FUEs are distributed randomly inside the area of 
their own cells with the range of radius, and each FUE or MUE has a different value of 
path gain. The path gain of each user depends on its distance from its own base station 
and the path loss exponent. The path gains of users will be computed from different 
positions of users, so the static scenario has been considered in our simulation.  
In multiple curves figures, a single curve corresponds to one specific user. All MUEs 
in both algorithms update their transmission power using (5.14), and all FUEs update 
their transmission power using (5.22) for our proposed algorithm and (5.28) in the 
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traditional algorithm. It is noted that the admission control is not considered in this 
simulation; therefore, no FUE is dropped from the system and the value of threshold 
f
i has been neglected.  
The simulations were executed three times: in low, medium, and high system loads, 
respectively, and the presented figures represent the evolutions of power and SINR and 
their average. The increase of system load shows the ability of macrocell users to in 
guaranteeing their QoS, and also shows the SINR degradation of femtocell users. In 
addition, increasing system loads show a significant reduction of powers among FUEs 
and MUEs that cannot be seen clearly in the low load system.  
We noted that the curves in Figure 5.5, Figure 5.7, and Figure 5.9, represent the 
values of power and SINR of all MUEs and FUEs with iterations. The curves in red 
colors represent the values of power and SINR of MUEs, whereas the curves in blue 
colors represent the values of power and SINR of FUEs. It is easy to see in the 
following figures that all MUEs in red curves consume higher power than FUEs in the 
blue curves, because FUEs are low-range and they have higher channel gain than 
MUEs.  
On the other hand, it is shown that the SINR values of all higher priority MUEs are 
the same (all MUEs converge to the target SINR 5mi ) without any reduction. The 
reason is due to the successful choice of MUEs utility function with zero-pricing 
function. The linear pricing function that is applied to the FUEs cost function is the 
reason of the reduction in the values of FUEs SINR, as shown in the blue curves of 
medium and high load system.    
 In Figure 5.5, we display the evolutions of power and SINR in both algorithms for 
all MUEs and FUEs in the low load system. All MUEs and FUEs converge to the SINR 
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requirements at the equilibrium, but the power consumed by MUEs and FUEs in the 
proposed algorithm is less than the power consumed by users in the traditional 
algorithm. The reduction in power cannot be seen clearly due to the density of user’s 
power curves in the figure, so the average performance has been computed and 
displayed in the following figures. Figure 5.6 presents the average power of MUEs and 
the average power and SINR of FUEs. We found that the average SINR is 992.3f  
in the proposed power control algorithm, and 997.3f  in the traditional algorithm, 
in which the difference between the two values is insignificant. On the other hand, the 
average power of MUEs is reduced by 4.39% compared to the traditional algorithm 
(final average power 5102254.2 mp versus 5103276.2 mp in the proposed 
algorithm and traditional, respectively), and the power of FUEs is reduced by 4.5% 
(final average power 6101935.1 fp versus 6102505.1 fp in the proposed 
algorithm and traditional algorithm, respectively). The minimum and maximum values 




Figure 5.5: performance comparison of proposed algorithm and traditional algorithm 
in low load system for all MUEs and FUEs.  
 
Figure 5.6: Average performance comparison of proposed algorithm and traditional 
algorithm in low load system. 






































































































































































In Table 5.2, it is found that the value of minimum and maximum powers of 
proposed algorithm is lower than the values of power in traditional algorithm.  These 
numerical values of powers will lead to decrease in the total interference.  
The advantage of the proposed algorithm is appeared clearly in the medium load test, 
as shown in Figure 5.7, and Figure 5.8. The average power reduction of MUEs is 68% 
(final average power 0015.0mp versus 0047.0mp  in the proposed algorithm and 
traditional algorithm, respectively), and the reduction of average power of femtocell 
users is 68% (final average power 5109749.4 fp versus 4105670.1 fp in the 
proposed algorithm and traditional algorithm). On the other hand, the evaluations show 
that only 0.038% reduction in average SINR, 6372.3f   in the proposed algorithm as 
opposed to 6502.3f  in the traditional algorithm. As shown in Table 5.2, the 
minimum value of FUEs SINR of the farthest user in our proposed algorithm is higher 










Table 5.2: Min, max SINR and power evaluations 






























5101297.5   

















7726.2  994.3  7108327.7   4105699.1 
 
4103799.1   0038.0  
Traditional  6635.2  9946.3  610438.2   410746.4 
 
4103505.4    0121.0  

















285.1  993.3  6102083.1 
 
4100408.3   410465.4   0204.0  




Figure 5.7: Performance comparison of proposed algorithm and traditional algorithm in 
medium load system for all MUEs and FUEs. 
 
Figure 5.8: Average performance comparison of proposed algorithm and Traditional 
algorithm in medium load system. 


























































































































































































In Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10, we display the evaluations of power and SINR in the 
high load network. Both algorithms smoothly reduce the SINRs of FUEs to let MUEs to 
reach their desired SINR target, but the SINRs of FUEs in our proposed algorithm has 
reasonable values. The average value of FUEs SINR is 108.3fi  in both algorithms. 
In addition, the reduction of the average power of MUEs is 55.2% (final average 
power 0072.0mip  versus 0.0161 in the proposed algorithm and traditional algorithm, 
respectively), and the reduction of the average power of FUEs is 55.7% (
4102715.1 fp versus 4105061.2 fp  in the proposed algorithm and traditional 
algorithm). Furthermore, the range of FUEs SINRs in the proposed algorithm is more 




Figure 5.9: Performance comparison of proposed algorithm and traditional 
algorithm in high load system for all MUEs and FUEs 4000ia . 






































































Figure 5.10: Average performance comparison of proposed algorithm and traditional 
algorithm in high load system. 
 
On the other hand, there will be a trade off between power consumption and 
convergence rate of algorithms. The point regarding this issue is that although it seems 
that the proposed method imposes higher level of complexity due to the square term of 
the pricing part and local gain term, but the function argument is small enough to be 
well approximated by the first terms of the corresponding Taylor series. 
 Conclusion 5.5
In this chapter, we have proposed a new power control algorithm to manage the 
distributed interference in the two-tier networks. Specifically, a new design of power 
control for the FUEs has been considered. It has been shown that the proposed power 
control algorithm of FUEs is able to mitigate the cross-tier interference, making the 
MUEs maintaining their desired SINR requirements easily. The convergence of the 
proposed power control algorithm has been proved analytically and the features are 









































































































CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
This chapter summarizes and concludes the thesis, followed by a discussion on future 
work that this work could lead to.  
 Conclusion 6.1
The main objective of this research is to solve the problem of power control in the 
modern cognitive radio and femtocell networks based on game theory framework. In 
particular, the research focuses on the design of distributed power control algorithms 
that can reduce power consumed, mitigate interference, and achieve the required QoS in 
the desired wireless systems. To achieve this, the previous concepts of power control 
based on the control theory perspective that has been applied in cellular networks were 
studied and reviewed.  
In addition, we briefly reviewed the transition of the implementation of QoS from 
cellular to wireless data networks. The concepts of macroeconomics and game theory 
have been employed to represent the QoS of users in appropriate manner in data 
networks. The QoS in data communication systems has been represented using utility 
(cost) function rather than SIR, which describes the satisfaction of users. This has led us 
to the use of a utility (cost) function that reduces the power consumption of user’s 
terminals.     
In chapter 3, 
it is found that the distributed power control formulas of cellular networks that was 
designed by control theory can be also obtained from game theory based on the 
declaration of utility or cost function. In practical, we also found that DPC algorithm 
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guides users to achieve the target SIR but if there is an insignificant reduction of users 
SIR, this will be lead to significant reduction in user’s consume power.  
In control theory perspective, slight reduction of SIR can be obtained by subtracting 
the output of DPC from some applied functions of channel status. On the other hand, 
game theory used the pricing techniques as an effective way to make this reduction. In 
the first power control algorithm, we introduced a new SIR based sigmoid cost function, 
which is defined as a weighted sum of power and a square of signal to interference ratio 
(SIR) error based on sigmoid function.  
The proposed algorithm guide CR users to efficient Nash equilibrium point 
compared to other algorithms, in which it achieves a significant reduction in power with 
the same level of average SIR. The algorithm guarantees the quality of service of CRs 
as well as ensures that interference is below the interference temperature level and does 
not affect QoS of licensed users. In this situation, licensed network can maximize 
spectrum utilization by allowing many CRs to access the available parts.  
We have also improved the convergence of proposed power control algorithm that is 
based on fixed point iteration method by using another numerical method. We have 
used Newton iterative method to accelerate the sigmoid based power control algorithm. 
Selecting an appropriate value of the perturbation fraction can lead to fast convergence 
of algorithm. 
In chapter 4, 
we have designed a power control game for cognitive radio network based on energy 
efficient utility function. Here, we have proposed a novel utility function via pricing to 
formulate the non-cooperative power control game. In this algorithm, we have obtained 
higher SIR for CR users closer to base station, while the pricing is strictly applied to the 
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farthest users who represent the source of interference. The proposed algorithm simply 
requires only local information to maximize the net utility (utility-price) of each CR. 
We have obtained better power saving and fast convergence as compared with recently 
works in the literature. 
In chapter 5,  
we have proposed a power control algorithm for distributed interference management 
in femtocell network using game theory. In this work, we have strictly enforced the QoS 
requirements of MUEs by guaranteeing that preferential users can achieve the minimum 
SINRs. On the other hand, we have successfully achieved both ―soft‖ QoS provisioning 
and an optimized power consumed. In addition, the proposed algorithms for both MUEs 
and FUEs require only local information to autonomously maximize the net utility. We 
have showed that the proposed power control algorithm of FUEs is able to mitigate the 
cross-tier interference, making the MUEs maintaining their desired SINR requirements 
easily. 
 Future research 6.2
Numerical results obtainable in this thesis present the common objective of 
improving the spectrum sharing efficiency of wireless networks via an efficient power 
control algorithms and interference management. During the simulation, primary users 
in cognitive radio network are not considered as decision makers (players) in the game 
model. Considering primary users inside the game model with different utility function 
and different strategy will be a good extension of the proposed algorithms in chapter 3 
and 4. Moreover, we proposed an efficient pricing technique in our works to reduce 
transmit power from cognitive radio users located at the cell boundary, but another 
technique such as soft handover is able to combine the received signals from more than 
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single cognitive base stations. Thus in the future research, it will be motivating to 
consider the propose power control algorithm in soft handover environment.      
In addition, the convergence of power control algorithms is an important issue and it 
need another research based on available numerical methods.  
Recently, energy efficiency in the small-cell networks (i.e., femtocell, picocell) is 
crucial to prolong the operational time of battery-based wireless user devices.  
The cooperative relay is another technique that is able to improve the coverage of 
femtocell without interfere the existing macrocells users (Pabst et al. 2004). Therefore, 
energy-efficient power control and selective relaying is another is another direction of 
future research for potential energy saving.      
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